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Germany in the Nineteenth Century,

Second Series


BY

A. S. PEAKE, B. BOSANQUET, AND F. BONAVIDA

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 *The first Series of these Lectures, containing contributions by Dr. Holland Rose on The Political History, Professor Herford on The Intellectual and Literary History, Professor Gonner on The Economic History, and Dr. M. E. Sadler on The History of Education, may be had at the price of 2/6 net. The complete book, consisting of both series bound in one volume, is issued at the price of 6/- net.*

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NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

THIS BOOK, first published in 1912, was based upon a course of lectures delivered in 1911 in the University, largely through the initiative of Professor Herford. The relations between England and Germany had long left much to be desired, and it was believed that appreciations by British scholars of the part played by Germany in the development of modern civilisation might serve to promote more friendly feelings between the two nations. The welcome given to the volume by the press of both countries, the exhaustion of two large editions within less than two years, and the issue of a German translation by Professor Breul, of Cambridge, suggested that this expectation was not wholly a vain one.

The studies embraced in the earlier editions were designedly drawn upon broad lines, and omitted much. Accordingly, when, in the early part of 1914, it was clear that a third edition would soon be wanted, three other scholars were invited to contribute additional studies from fresh points of view. The University was fortunate in securing the co-operation of experts, such as Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, who has written on philosophy, of Professor Peake, who has contributed a study on theology, and of Mr. Ferruccio Bonavia, who has treated of music. The lectures on these subjects were delivered in the University during the course of last spring, and by the summer of this year, all three studies were in type. The sudden outbreak of the present calamitous war frustrated the hopes of those who had steadily believed that the best method to promote international

goodwill was to dispel the cloud of suspicion by the spread of sound knowledge. It seemed as if the book had failed in its objects, and might quietly be put aside as no longer possessing any practical value. On the other hand, the demand for copies has continued on both sides of the Atlantic, and a refusal to reissue the work might well give rise to misconception. The writers can no longer take the optimistic line which they so recently felt justified in assuming, yet they do not regret that, in their anxiety to take a favourable view of Germany's attitude, they under-estimated the sinister influences which for the present have proved triumphant. For this reason they offer to the public this edition. If no longer a friendly *eirenicon*, the book remains as an historical document, which retains whatever validity it ever possessed, notwithstanding the frustration of the hopes with which it was originally put forth. It may still have its value as suggesting what a group of British scholars, trained in various schools of learning and different branches of knowledge, thought, and in essentials still think, was a just tribute to pay to the activities of the German nation. The Germany of militant aggression, of violated faith, of cynical self-seeking and disregard of the honourable traditions of civilised warfare is new to them, as, in its extremest manifestations it is to the world at large. So far as it may have been latent, it lay outside their purpose.

The studies are, with the consent of the writers, reprinted in the form in which they originally appeared. No doubt there are passages in more than one of the chapters, which the authors, were they writing now, would have phrased differently. Substantially, however, the writers are content to have written what they have

written, and they prefer that some touches of optimism should remain, rather than that misconceptions should be aroused by any attempt to "bring up to date" the original essays. No alterations whatever have been admitted to the text, and the only addition is a brief note at the end of the paper of Dr. Holland Rose.

We have also to look forward to the time when an honourable settlement becomes possible without relinquishing the objects for which we have reluctantly drawn the sword. It can at least be hoped that a book aiming at the appreciation of the saner and salutary aspects of the German nation and the German state may not stand in the way of the terribly difficult task of building up once more mutual good-will and respect between nations which, in the future, as in the past, will have somehow to live and work together.

T. F. TOUT.

10th November, 1914.

PREFACE.

THE First Series of Lectures published under this title appeared in the spring of 1912. The favourable reception accorded to them, as well as to the German translation, by Professor Karl Breul, issued at the beginning of the present year, has encouraged the publication of a Second Series. The Committee of the Manchester University Press has authorised this step the more readily since the original five lectures confessedly left untouched many sections of the vast and complex domain denoted by the title, and in fact offered the reader merely a meagre instalment of what he had a right to expect. The second instalment now issued is still far indeed from exhausting the field. But it at least makes good three capital deficiencies. There may, for aught we know, be out of the way corners of the fields of science and art, of theory and practice, of work and play, to which Germany in the Nineteenth Century made only negligible contributions. But the student of Philosophy, or of Theology, who should neglect what Germany effected in these domains, virtually turns his back also upon the Nineteenth Century itself. Of her Music it would be superfluous to speak. It is hoped that the three essays now published, the work of men whose life-labours have brought them into close and continual touch with the scholarly or creative energy of Germany in their several fields, may, like their predecessors, prove acceptable, whether as sources of information often difficult of access, or as attempts to sift and evaluate some passages of enduring moment in a history of modern civilisation.

C. H. HERFORD.

The University,
Manchester,

13 November, 1914.

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GERMANY IN THE 19th CENTURY.

SECOND SERIES.

SHORT SUMMARY.

VI.—THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGY.

By Professor A. S. PEAKE.

Limitations of the discussion. Schleiermacher the most influential theologian of the century. His personality and training. His *Speeches on Religion*. Orthodox and rationalist identified religion with a series of doctrines. Schleiermacher found its essence in feeling, the realisation that we are one with the Infinite. His religion had a pantheistic basis. While intensely individualist he emphasised the social quality of religion. "Natural Religion" repudiated. His system of theology. Religion as feeling of dependence. The Christian consciousness as the source of theology. Theology Christo-centric. His treatment of Theology as an organic whole. General estimate of Schleiermacher. The breach with rationalism involved in his emphasis on history and estimate of Jesus, and with orthodoxy involved in his free attitude to Scripture, raised the problem by what right Schleiermacher accorded Christ a central place in his system. Strauss forced this into prominence by his *Life of Jesus*. He regarded the Christian religion as independent of its Founder. The eternal ideas gain by being disengaged from dubious history. The historical Jesus becomes the Christ of the Gospels by mythical accretion due to Messianic dogma. F. C. Baur compared with Strauss. Baur said *The Life of Jesus* gave a criticism of the Gospel history without a criticism of the Gospels. The growth of the Tübingen criticism. Sketch of the theory. The objections by which it has been discredited. Why, nevertheless, Baur has an epoch-making significance. Other New Testament scholars of the century. The course of Pentateuch criticism and the chief contributions to the generally accepted theory. The criticism of other parts of the Old Testament. Other leading Old Testament scholars. Strauss in his *Christian Doctrine* seeks to prove the bankruptcy of Christianity. The successors of Schleiermacher. The Liberal, Confessional, and Mediating

theologians. Ritschl and his theological development. Ritschlianism designed to meet the widespread lapse from faith. Judgments of value. Ritschl's greatness as a system-builder. Emphasises uniqueness of Christianity, and impossibility of understanding it except from the inside. Only members of the Christian community qualified to estimate the religion. The community, which is to be distinguished from the empirical church, is the object of justification. The Gospel the guarantee of the Christian consciousness. The Gospel to be found in the New Testament, since its writers understood the religion of the Old Testament and were free from the influence of Greek thought and Jewish Rabbinism. The apostolic testimony is necessary as well as the utterances of the Founder. Yet the Gospel is distilled from the New Testament not identified with it. It thus becomes possible to use it as a test of traditional theology, of which much is swept aside. Ritschl's definition of Christianity. Redemption and the Kingdom of God. Hatred of Mysticism, Pietism, Emotionalism. Pietism regarded as an attenuated form of Catholicism masquerading as Protestantism. Ritschlianism and metaphysics. Ritschl's attitude to the New Testament controlled by presuppositions now largely abandoned by his own followers - - - - - p. 129

VII.—THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

By Dr. BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Although it is hopeless in a single lecture to give an idea of the detail, it may be possible to convey some impression of the main rhythm and direction, of the philosophical growth in question.

One might suggest the common triple rhythm, Creation, Disintegration, Recovery, or, including the direction, Metaphysic, Positivism, and Metaphysic again; or to put a point on it: Hegelian, neo Kantian (=anti Hegelian), neo-Hegelian. This would be repudiated in Germany to-day; but we might try "Post-Kantian; neo-Kantian; post-neo-Kantian."

This would divide roughly thus:—

1. Post-Kantian, Beginnings of Fichte to recognition of Schopenhauer (say) 1794-1844;
2. Neo-Kantian, Liebmann's "Back to Kant," to (say) Avenarius' "Critique of Pure Experience," 1865-1888;
3. The final stage of neo-Kantianism, and parallel movements, 1888 to the present day.

Many great men, just because above their time, hardly fit into

this scheme, *e.g.*, Fechner, Lotze, Wundt. Of course, Experimental Psychology and Voluntarism came largely from them. In speaking of *Phase 1*.

Begin with a letter of Hegel in 1795, showing his initial anticipations in relation to the formative influences of the day: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schiller and Goethe. Estimate his method and Fichte's, which has been much misapprehended. The essence of this philosophy is the forward, adventurous and realising interpretation of Kant. How "critical." It affirms reality of perfection, identity of real and ideal, in sense of Religion.

Phase 2.

The new situation—dates—a reaction to defensive interpretation of Kant; Metaphysic is replaced by Epistemology, which has vogue till almost to-day—*i.e.* reality is cut down to what is given *in* consciousness, and what can be got out of that. "Limits of Knowledge" the problem. Real and Ideal separated. Lange. Kant's 'ought,' in contrast to 'is,' reinstated. Open future, with infinite progress in universe, maintained; new ideas which come to aid of this. Point of view of *morality* made absolute against that of *religion*. Illustrated by Vaihinger's "As if"—doctrine of fictions and ideal. "Critical" Philosophies in sense of anti-metaphysical. "Positivism," &c.

Phase 3.

Experience treated more systematically. Avenarius' "*full* experience." More talk of at least preparing for a metaphysic. Distinction between *in* consciousness and *for* consciousness. Idealism and realism both more solid. Natorp, Cassirer, Husserl, Külpe, Driesch, Nelson. A reasonable apriorism. Hopes for metaphysic - - - - - p. 185

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By F. BONAVIA.

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and rhythm used as means to dramatic effect. The C Minor Symphony, first musical composition indissolubly connected with spirit of the time. Pastoral symphonies and the beginning of the feeling for Nature. The result of the nine symphonies in Germany, France and Italy. Schubert. Growth of romantic feeling with Mendelssohn and Schumann. Foundations of musical criticism. "Neue Zeitschrift für Musik." Brahms the last of great composers of symphonies.

(b) *The Opera*. Rivalry between Italian and German schools is also the rivalry between an essentially melodic and a polyphonic style. Vocalists, their influence on composers. Weber's victory over Spontini. Fidelio. Oberon and Euryanthe. Wagner's themes. Simplicity of the story essential to Wagnerian opera. The use of the leit-motif. Relation of words to music. The poetic genius of Wagner. Ideal of self-sacrifice and ideal of the "Uebermensch!" Parsifal as the typical Wagnerian hero. Novalis and Overbeck—like Wagner, drew inspiration from religious themes. More comprehensive feeling for Nature. Critical writings. Liszt and the symphonic poem. Certain limitations of Liszt's music. Historians and teachers in Germany. Their influence abroad. Excellence of German organisation. Close of the century and the future outlook - - - - p. 217

VI.—THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGY

BY

A. S. PEAKE, D.D.

THE HISTORY OF THEOLOGY.¹

THE task of attempting to cover in so brief a space the whole field of German theology during the nineteenth century, would be so impracticable, that I have limited myself to Systematic Theology and Biblical Criticism. Even with this restriction, the field is so wide that I am glad to be able to refer for the the background to Prof. Herford's lecture, and also to be exonerated from the duty of touching on the development of philosophy, which its intimate connexion with theology would otherwise have necessitated. It has been inevitable that many names, which would have deserved attention in a record with any pretence to completeness, should here be passed over in silence or simply accorded the barest mention. It has seemed to me desirable to restrict myself for the most part to the outstanding names, and deal with these with a fulness which I trust will not seem disproportionate.² No apology will be needed for the omission of

1. I have to thank my colleague, Dr. Robert Mackintosh, for his kindness in reading the text of the lecture and making several suggestions to me. He is not to be held responsible for any of the opinions expressed, and is probably not always in agreement with them. But I have been glad to benefit by his expert knowledge, especially in the section on Ritschl.

2. Good bibliographies on the outstanding figures are to be found in Herzog-Hauck's *Realencyclopædie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche*; the two supplementary volumes (1913) should not be overlooked. The *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia* may be recommended for this purpose to those who have not access to Herzog-Hauck. I add here a brief bibliography of works that cover the whole or a large part of the field, reserving the literature on individual theologians or movements till I come to speak of them in the course of the lecture. Where English translations are available I have referred to these in preference to the originals. I have not thought it necessary to insert lengthy lists of the writings of the theologians or critics with whom I deal, nor do I repeat with reference to them the books which treat of the subject as

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German theologians of the Roman communion, nor do I need to explain that this is due to no depreciation of their great contributions to theological scholarship, but to the fact that their theology does not possess a nationalist character.

When Schleiermacher ^{2a} died in 1834, Neander said to his students, "We have lost a man from whom will be dated henceforth a new era in the history of theology." Time has justified this verdict from the lips of a scholar who, alike as Schleiermacher's pupil and colleague and as a master of Church History, was exceptionally well-qualified to pronounce it. Among all the theologians of the nineteenth century he was, it can hardly be questioned, the most influential, the one to whom the epithet epoch-making can most fitly be assigned. The publication of his famous "Speeches on Religion to the Cultured among those who

a whole. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (1889); Pfleiderer, *The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, and its Progress in Britain since 1825* (1890); Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, vol. ii (1871); Frank, *Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie* (1898); W. Adams Brown, *The Essence of Christianity* (1903); Oman, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries* (1906); E. C. Moore, *An Outline of the History of Christian Thought since Kant* (1912); Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl* (1892). The relevant articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in *Herzog-Hauck*, and in the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia* may be consulted. The last gives a summary of the German articles in *Herzog-Hauck*. On the earlier period, A. M. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* (1893); Matheson, *Aids to the Study of German Theology* (1874); V. F. Storr, *The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800—1860* (1913); Baur, *Kirchengeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (1877); Baur, *Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte*, vol. iii, (1867); Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (1906), Eng. trans. *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1910); *Geschichte der paulin. Forschung* (1911); Eng. trans. *Paul and his Interpreters* (1912).

2a. For Schleiermacher, see Dilthey, *Schleiermacher's Leben* (1870) (the first volume only was published, which is very unfortunate in view of its excellence); *Aus Schleiermacher's Leben in Briefen* (1850), Eng.

Disdain it,"³ fell just outside our limits, since it was given to the world in 1799. But it would probably be no exaggeration to say that, beyond any book since published, it has moulded and stimulated men's thoughts on religion. It is with this book that our story must begin. Many influences had gone to its making. Its author was the son of an orthodox and pious military chaplain belonging to the Reformed Church. He was educated by the Moravians, within the rather narrow limits permitted in their community. Here he gained an insight he never lost into the essential quality of religion, though as he advanced in independence of judgment, he found its coveted experiences artificial and its intellectual limitations intolerable.⁴ He came under the influence of Plato, and his interpretation of Plato's philosophy and translation of his works greatly contributed to the deeper and truer appreciation of Platonism in Germany. Among modern

trans. by Frederica Rowan, *The Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters* (1860). The literature on Schleiermacher in German is very extensive; in English there is comparatively little, special mention may be made of *Schleiermacher: a Critical and Historical Study*, by W. B. Selbie (1913), and *Schleiermacher, Personal and Speculative*, by R. Munro (1903). Of the German works the following may be named: Strauss, *Charakteristiken und Kritiken* (1839); Schaller, *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher* (1844); Fischer, *Schleiermacher* (1899). For literature on the "Reden über die Religion" see the next note, and for "Die christliche Glaube," see below, p. 138.

3. *Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*; Eng. trans. by J. Oman, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1893). See A. Ritschl, *Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion, und ihre Nachwirkungen auf die evangelische Kirche Deutschlands* (1874); O. Ritschl, *Schleiermacher's Stellung zum Christentum in seinen Reden über die Religion* (1888). On Lipsius' article and Pünjer's critical edition, see below, p. 137.

4. For Schleiermacher's relations with his father and the Moravians and his religious struggles, see especially the letters which passed between Schleiermacher and his father, *The Life of Schleiermacher as unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters*, vol. i, pp. 46—69, and the fragment of autobiography prefixed to the letters, pp. 5—12.

philosophers he was specially impressed by Spinoza and Kant and to some extent by Schelling. He was one of the most widely cultured men of his time, and his close relations with the Romantic Movement and its leaders gave him an insight into the type of mind to which the Speeches are specially addressed. Yet while he drew from many sources he was not mastered by them. His own personality remained dominant and fused the material they offered him into a new and independent system. He was many-sided beyond most of his contemporaries, a philosopher of great depth and originality, but still more significant in the realm of theology, an accomplished humanist, a magnetic orator, who stood in the line of Germany's greatest preachers, an ecclesiastical statesman of lofty principles and rare courage. Much of his influence was due to the fact that in his widely cultured and sympathetic personality the best tendencies and characteristics of his age found their completest incarnation.

The "Speeches on Religion" were not actually delivered. They were specially designed for those who from the standpoint of culture looked down on religion as a superannuated absurdity. There was indeed some excuse for this supercilious attitude. Religion was represented mainly by two types; an arid orthodoxy was confronted by an equally arid rationalism. In their conception of religion there was nothing in principle to choose between them. Both sides found the essence of religion in a series of intellectual propositions. The dogmas held were entirely different in the two cases. The orthodox laid special stress on the doctrines which were peculiar to Christianity. These the rationalists tended to set aside, emphasizing in their stead the principles of Natural Religion as they understood it, such doctrines as they imagined the unsophisticated intellect left to itself would spontaneously generate. The Pietists had a deeper and truer sense of what religion was, yet they had not

broken away from the idea that the current orthodoxy must be accepted. Dogma was for them also an integral element in religion.

The distinction between theology and religion had of course been drawn by earlier thinkers; but Schleiermacher has the distinction of having carried it out much more systematically and thoroughly. With his Moravian experience behind him he found the essence of religion in feeling. In his great work "The Christian Faith," he described it more specifically as a feeling of absolute dependence, a description which drew from Hegel the sneer, barbed by personal dislike as well as intellectual disagreement, that on this showing the dog should be the most religious of beings since it exhibited the feeling of absolute dependence in the fullest degree.⁵ It need hardly be said that Schleiermacher was not really open to the charge of defining religion so crudely as to justify such a taunt. When we are dealing with a great religious genius like Schleiermacher, perhaps the greatest figure in this realm since the Reformation, and one whose impact upon the development of theology has in all that period been unsurpassed, we may regard it as incredible that he should have intended anything which could have been adequately characterised in so cheap a gibe. He meant something much higher than some pure gush of emotion without any intellectual element or influence

5. Schleiermacher and Hegel were colleagues in the University of Berlin for thirteen years. The former was Professor there from the foundation of the University in 1810 to his death in 1834, Hegel from 1818 to 1831. Their relations were not cordial, and there was an element of wilfulness in the estimate formed of each other's position. Comparisons between the two systems may be seen in Baur's *Die christliche Gnosis* (1835), pp. 668—671 (this, it should be remembered, follows an exposition of Schleiermacher's dogmatics, and introduces that of Hegel's philosophy of religion), *Kirchengeschichte*, 2nd ed., pp. 368—376; *Dogmengeschichte*, iii, 349—353; Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, pp. 226—229; Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, 1st ed., pp. 27—35; Oman, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*, pp. 242—255.

upon the will or the conduct. Finite and isolated selves as we are, an experience is possible to us in which we transcend these limitations and know ourselves to be one with the universe. For the individual is at root one with the universal life, the cosmic energy finds its point of manifestation in the individual consciousness, the life which throbs in the All pulsates also in the One. And when there comes to any finite spirit this sense of the All in the One and the One in the All, in that ecstatic moment, that flash of illumination, religion is born. The core of the religious experience is thus emotional, but it is emotion at its highest, created by this intuition of unity and emancipating the individual from the finite by making it one with the Infinite life.

Although Schleiermacher would not admit that the charge of pantheism urged against him was correct, and the point has been a good deal debated, the conception of the universe involved in this representation of religion is probably pantheistic. He seems to have lost and never to have regained a clear, strong hold upon the personality of God. His oft-quoted panegyric on Spinoza⁶ is eloquent of his affinities, though, as Strauss pointed out, it describes a Spinoza with a likeness to Schleiermacher which the real Spinoza did not exhibit.⁷ It is a question, however, which deserves some attention whether he moved towards a more definitely Christian position than that held by him when he wrote the Speeches. Some have charged him with

6. "Offer with me reverently a tribute to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza. The high World-Spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his being and his end; the Universe was his only and his everlasting love. In holy innocence and in deep humility he beheld himself mirrored in the eternal world, and perceived how he also was its most worthy mirror. He was full of religion, full of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore he stands there alone and unequalled; master in his art, yet without disciples and without citizenship, sublime above the profane tribe" (Eng. trans., p. 40).

7. Strauss, *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*, p. 25, a judgment endorsed by Baur, *Kirchengeschichte*, p. 99.

growing narrower and more timid with the lapse of time, of abandoning his early pantheism for a more definitely Christian view. It is no doubt the case that there is a marked difference between the first edition of the Speeches and his great dogmatic treatise. Changes were made in the successive editions of the Speeches, and Schleiermacher appended a series of explanations to them, designed to bring out the substantial agreement in content, with full acknowledgment of the difference in form, between his earlier and his later views.⁸ We must not forget that the Speeches were intended for a special class of readers, and that Schleiermacher had to plead the cause of religion with those who held it in scorn, and therefore was limited by the very conditions of his enterprise to such arguments as would impress them, and was unable to utter his full mind. We may accept with some confidence the conclusion that the movement of thought was not so great as some have asserted.

The religious intuition, which Schleiermacher depicts in language of youthful and at times almost dithyrambic eloquence, was of course an individual experience, the fulness of which no words could adequately describe. It

8. See what he says on this in the Explanations to the Second Speech : "For understanding my whole view I could desire nothing better than that my readers should compare these Speeches with my *Christliche Glaubenslehre*. In form they are very different and their points of departure lie far apart, yet in matter they are quite parallel. But to provide the Speeches for this purpose with a complete Commentary was impossible, and I must content myself with single references to such passages as seem to me capable of appearing contrary or at least of lacking agreement" (Eng. trans., p. 105). In an important article (*Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1875) Lipsius instituted a careful comparison between the different editions. Pünjer published a critical edition in 1879, which gave the first edition in the text and the variations of the later editions in the Apparatus. The Explanations were inserted, it should be added, in the third edition, which was published in 1821. A convenient discussion of the question raised is given by W. Adams Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*, pp. 158—160; a fuller examination may be found in the Introduction to the English translation.

was immediate and personal, not drawn from any external institution nor imposed by any external authority. Yet it is one of Schleiermacher's conspicuous merits that this individualist conception of religion did not lead him to undervalue its social side. The experience constitutes a bond of union, and those of the same time tend inevitably to combine in societies. The different types of religion find expression in Founders who gather about them those who respond to their message, whose experience is answered in their own, and thus religions are born. The Natural Religion, of which the rationalists talked, was a mere artificial abstraction, which had never found any true realisation, inasmuch as genuine religion has never existed outside these communities. If we are to understand the real significance of religion we must renounce the hope that any flight of speculation will reach it. It will yield its secret only to those who are prepared for a patient historical investigation into the forms which it has created. Of these there are many, none without worth, but Christianity is supreme. It is not to be reduced to a mere republication of Natural Religion. The elimination of its specific characteristics in the interest of giving it a more universal quality would rob it of what was most precious.

His system of theology was expounded in his great work "The Christian Faith."⁹ In spite of Ritschl's deprecia-

9. *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt*. The first edition was published in 1821. The second (1830-31) was considerably altered. The later editions published since Schleiermacher's death are reprints of the second. My edition is the fourth (1842-43), and occupies the third and fourth volumes of the Collected Works. It is not very creditable that no English translation exists; but the lack of it has been largely supplied by the admirable analysis published by G. Cross under the title *The Theology of Schleiermacher* (1911). Special studies are devoted to it by Rosenkranz, *Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre* (1836), and Clemen, *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (1906). On Baur's *Die christliche Gnosis*, see p. 135

tory estimate¹⁰ we may rightly accord it an epoch-making character in the history of theology. It may be, and probably is, quite true that the system it expounds existed as a unity and in its entirety in no other mind than that of its author. But its influence, direct or indirect, on the whole subsequent development of German theology, not to speak of all that it has meant to the study of the subject in other lands, can scarcely be overrated. In the strict sense of the term we ought not to speak of a school of Schleiermacher. But the three main types of theology which lay between him and Ritschl all bore the marks of his influence; and Ritschl himself, in spite of his cool and critical attitude, owed much to him. Into the details of his system it is obviously impossible for me to go, but some of the more significant features must be briefly indicated. I place first its conception of religion. This is defined not simply as feeling, but as feeling of absolute dependence. As in the "Speeches," the standpoint is pantheistic, though less noticeably so; and this comes to expression in the definition of religion which has no reference to fellowship, kernel of the religious experience though it surely is. Yet the emphasis on feeling is one of Schleiermacher's imperishable claims on our gratitude. In another respect his work marked a great advance. The source of theology he found in the Christian consciousness. Its material could not be derived from any external authority, accepted without question and untested by appeal to experience. With the protest of the rationalists against such uncritical acquiescence he was in full sympathy. But he entirely repudiated the indifference to history which was blind to the differentia of Christianity, and counted any religion valuable only in so far as it propounded dogmas common to all rational religions alike. Schleiermacher's historical sense was too keen to allow

10. In the first volume of his *Justification and Reconciliation*, chap. ix, and of course elsewhere.

such an attitude. Christianity was precious in virtue of what was peculiar to it. When it was compared with other religions, the important fact at once emerged that it accorded a unique place and significance to its Founder. He did not simply communicate a doctrine which could then be propagated in independence of him. He was Himself an integral element in the religion. The witness of the Christian consciousness accorded to Christ a central place. In thus making theology Christo-centric he proved once more a pioneer, whom many followed in the path he had opened up. It is a striking fact that Schleiermacher was the first theologian to give a definition of Christianity in which explicit mention was made of its Founder. His definition is as follows: "Christianity is a monotheistic form of faith which belongs to the teleological type of piety, and is essentially distinguished from others of its class by this, that everything in it is referred to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." He drew his conception of Jesus especially from the Fourth Gospel, which seemed to him to present a more authentic and adequate portrait than that given by the Synoptists. This predilection for John, which was not surprising in a theologian so sympathetic with Platonism, was characteristic of the theologians who stood specially under his influence. On the physical miracles he was disposed to lay but little stress, but he emphasises the moral miracle all the more, affirming not merely the actual sinlessness, but the impeccability of Christ. He lived within the limits of human life, yet He was the archetypal man, in whom the ideal of humanity was realised. What He is we learn from what He does. He makes us sure of God, since He knows no shadow of misgiving. He frees us from the thralldom of sin, and therefore can never have been defeated by it. Himself unstained by sin, He participates through His fellowship with our sinful race in those evils which justly affect us, but from which He might have claimed to be immune, and He mediates the blessings He

bestows through the society He has founded, of which He is the head. It may be regarded as somewhat surprising that Schleiermacher's theology should have been so Christian as it was. Another point that deserves to be made prominent is the emphasis which he laid upon the religious community. This is all the more noteworthy that his idea of religion was in some respects so subjective. It is so personal an experience to him that one might have expected him to be the prophet of an atomistic individualism. His attitude here was one of the features in his theology that Ritschl found most congenial. It was in the Christian consciousness I have said that he found the source of theology, but this consciousness was collective rather than merely individual. Only within the society could the individual attain his true development.

In another respect he introduced a new era, that is, in his presentation of theology as an organic whole. It had been customary under the influence of Melancthon's "Loci," to treat theology as a series of strung-together doctrines without inner connexion or dominating principle. With Schleiermacher theology became a system indeed, a close-knit organic unity radiating from a single centre. His great treatise witnessed to its author's exceptional architectonic gift; but this had already been exhibited in the sketch he had given of theological study.¹¹ Its quality is such as to draw from Ritschl a more whole-hearted praise than he will give to his dogmatic masterpiece. He refuses to accept the view that Schleiermacher marked an epoch as a pattern of theology which was fruitful in its results, but epoch-making he was as a theological legislator. No doubt Ritschl's estimates of Schleiermacher require to be received with caution. But without assenting to his depreciatory judgment of features in the system

11. *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (1811); Eng. trans. by W. Farrer under the title *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology* (1850); this contains Lücke's *Reminiscences of Schleiermacher*.

itself, which he had a congenital incapacity to appreciate, we must grant that he is a very competent judge whether what gives itself out to be a system is a system or not.

If then, before we part with Schleiermacher, we try in a few words to sum up our impression of the contribution he made, the following points perhaps most deserve recognition. He made an end of the prevalent confusion between religion and dogma, and the less pernicious it may be, but no less mistaken identification of religion with morality. Not indeed that to the author of the first scientific sketch of theological study doctrine could have been a matter of indifference, nor yet morality to one so preoccupied as he was with ethics. But he was concerned, as one who understood religion, to vindicate its independence and paint it in all its entrancing loveliness. As one who had drunk deep of its ecstasy and found in it life's most perfect bliss, he could not have reduced it to conduct, whether touched or untouched by emotion, nor imagined it to be exhausted in a creed. The magic by which it transfigures our common life he expresses in a noble metaphor. "A man's special calling," he says, "is the melody of his life, and it remains a simple, meagre series of notes unless religion, with its endlessly rich variety, accompany it with all notes, and raise the simple song to a full-voiced glorious harmony." He planned the lines on which the whole domain of theology should be laid out and made of it a thoroughly organised science, mapped out in bold, clear outline. In the field of Systematic Theology his great treatise constitutes a classic, apart from which the later movement of theology cannot be understood. He banished the disregard of history which had characterised the rationalist conception of religion and its undue stress on ideas, and made the Person of the Redeemer and His work central in theology. On the other hand, his relation to Scripture and traditional dogmatics was much more free than that of the orthodox. Yet his ambiguous

attitude towards the personality of God¹² and personal immortality,¹³ due alike to his pantheistic tendency, gravely limit his claim to be considered as an exponent of Christianity in the full sense of the term. And for all his sense of the value to be attached to history he lost not a little through his failure rightly to appreciate the significance of the Old Testament for the New, or to see how indispensable to Christianity was the religion out of which it grew.

Schleiermacher had insisted, I have said, on the connexion of religion with history. He had set a historical figure in the centre of his theology. But in doing so he had inevitably raised the question, What can

12. On this, see the Second Speech, pp. 92—99, with the Explanations pp. 115f. Zeller published an article on "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Personality of God" (*Theol. Jahrb.*, 1842), which Baur judged to be so exhaustive that he thought it unnecessary in his *Kirchengeschichte* to do more than summarise his main results. He adds his own judgment, however, to the effect that Schleiermacher cannot be acquitted of sophistry and diplomacy, and indeed that one cannot suppress the thought of an intentional deception. Zeller himself edited the volume, and added an interesting note explaining that he felt unable to alter the passage, since it was significant for Baur's own standpoint. He could not imagine it to be possible that a thinker so acute as Schleiermacher should have concealed from himself the patent contradiction between his own and the ecclesiastical dogma (pp. 213—216).

13. See the Second Speech, pp. 99—101 with the Explanations, pp. 117f. Where the emphasis for Schleiermacher lay may be seen from the closing sentences of the Second Speech: "It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which still is in time. It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are for ever to be engaged. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal, is the immortality of religion." See also the letters that passed between him and Henrietta von Willich after the death of her husband in 1807 (*Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 77—82). Martineau discusses Schleiermacher's doctrine of immortality, with special reference to these letters in *A Study of Religion*, vol. ii, 355—360 (1st ed.). Schleiermacher subsequently married Henrietta von Willich.

we know of this personality and will our knowledge justify us in granting Him a significance so momentous? Where history is admitted, criticism will not be denied. The deist and the rationalist saw in Christianity, so far as it was true, a republication of the truths of Natural Religion, independent, for their validity or acceptance, of the opinion entertained concerning the Founder. For the orthodox the question did not arise, it was settled by Scripture and the authoritative Symbols of the Church. But if Natural Religion was a fiction and Christianity was a Christo-centric religion, then the question, What think ye of Christ? could not be evaded; while if Scripture and the Confessions were no longer binding what justification could be given for claims so exceptional made for Jesus of Nazareth? Schleiermacher found what he needed in the Fourth Gospel; but Bretschneider's "*Probabilia*"¹⁴ had been published in 1820, a year before Schleiermacher's theological masterpiece, the forerunner of a criticism which has made his position increasingly difficult to hold. His preference for the Fourth Gospel as containing the most authentic portrait of Jesus was determined by dogmatic considerations and not securely based in objective criticism. The year which followed his death was to see the publication of a work in which criticism of the most drastic order was applied to the Gospel history. Moreover, from another side an influence of great importance was profoundly affecting theology; I mean the influence of philosophy, and in particular of Hegelianism. It need of course hardly be said that, all along, the development of theology had been deeply influenced by the parallel movement in philosophy. Schleiermacher himself was scarcely less eminent in one than in the other, and Plato, Spinoza, and contemporary philosophers, from Kant onwards, had found in him a diligent if discriminating student. Strauss, in fact, says, "None of the leading

14. *Probabilia de evangelii et epistolarum Joannis apostoli indole et origine.*

propositions of the first part of Schleiermacher's 'Glaubenslehre' can be fully understood save as they are re-translated into the formulæ of Spinoza, from which they were originally taken."¹⁵ For the philosophy of Hegel, however, which was destined to have the most momentous influence on theology, he had little sympathy, and Hegel repaid him in kind. Mutual antipathy accentuated the differences in point of view and prevented them from realising such affinity as there was between them. I cannot of course trespass in this lecture on the adjoining field, but this reminder at least is necessary before I begin to speak of Strauss and the Tübingen School. When Strauss published his "Life of Jesus" it was commonly considered to be an application of Hegelianism to the Gospel history and the figure of Jesus.¹⁶ But F. C. Baur points out that we must recognise over and above this a critical tendency which was not necessarily, and indeed had not been, associated with that philosophy.¹⁷

Strauss¹⁸ had been a pupil of Baur at Blaubeuren in his youth, and he had listened to lectures by Schleier-

15. *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*, p. 166.

16. Strauss expressed his own views on Hegel's relation, first to theological criticism, then to the Gospel history, in his *Streitschriften, Drittes Heft*, pp. 17—94; the section dealing with the Gospel history contains a catena of important quotations from Hegel, with comments by the author. In the earlier part Strauss gives a noteworthy statement as to the way in which he came to write the *Life of Jesus*.

17. *Kirchengeschichte*, p. 380; *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 356. Cf. what Strauss himself says as to Hegel's own attitude to historical criticism ("Hegel was personally no friend of historical criticism") and the relation of the system to it, *Streitschriften*, pp. 61f.

18. On Strauss, see Zeller, *D. Fr. Strauss in seinem Leben und seinen Schriften* (1874); Hausrath, *D. F. Strauss und die Theologie seiner Zeit* (1876-78); Ziegler, *David Friedrich Strauss* (198). On the *Leben Jesu* of 1835 Schweitzer gives a list of sixty works issued during the next few years in Anhang I of his *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*. It is not reproduced in the English translation, but ample information is given in chap. ix. Schweitzer's own discussions are of particular interest.

macher at Berlin. But Hegel, to hear whom he had journeyed to Berlin, had been removed by sudden death in 1831. The philosopher's teaching, however, had deeply influenced the young student, and thus he was brought to the problem of Christology. Too candid to leave the crucial issues in the ambiguous twilight in which it might be felt that Schleiermacher had left them, too courageous to shrink from any conclusions because they might prove unwelcome to himself or others, he took up the examination of the Gospels, with results such as might have been anticipated from his presuppositions. Convinced that Christianity was the religion, which embodied in symbolic form the permanently precious truth of philosophy, he felt that he could dispense with history, and detach the religion from the personality of its Founder. The idea of incarnation was profoundly true, but it was the incarnation of the idea in the race rather than in the individual. For the idea does not realise itself in so limited a fashion. "It is not wont," he says, "to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar and be niggardly towards all others—to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest; it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realisation of the idea? Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realisation, than when I single out one man as such a realisation? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time." ¹⁹ Approaching the Gospels in this attitude, he felt that criticism need be troubled by no scruples as to the bearing of its results on faith. Indeed the religion stood to gain.

19. *Life of Jesus*, p. 779. (I quote from the second edition published with an Introduction by Pfleiderer in 1892.)

The eternal ideas would thus be disengaged from their setting, and when the history was dissolved into myth, would appear in their unalloyed splendour. When thus re-interpreted the documents would be rehabilitated in a higher sense. Taken as literal history, their discrepancies, and in particular the miracles in which they abound, were an offence to the culture of the day. Press home the conclusion that documents so mutually contradictory can be used only with extreme caution and after the application of the most rigid critical tests; expose the intrinsic incredibility of the miracles, but also devise a theory which shall account for the rise of such miraculous stories; and religion will be all the stronger if, driven from the letter, it rises to the spirit.

The explanation that Strauss gave as to the origin of the narratives which had thus to be eliminated from history is known as the mythical theory. By this, of course, it is not meant that Strauss denied that Jesus was a historical personage or that we have some well guaranteed information about Him; though it must be confessed that Strauss was so concerned with negative criticism and so little with positive reconstruction that the extent of this information was very far from clear. A theory much in vogue when Strauss published his "Life of Jesus" in 1835 was the naturalistic theory. Its chief exponent was Paulus. The historicity of the narratives was asserted, but their miraculous character was denied, by expedients sometimes not without plausibility, but in other instances frankly grotesque. Strauss effectively disposed of this theory which, in spite of occasional recourse to it in detail, is never likely to be rehabilitated as a whole. His own criticism cut much deeper. While he denied that the miraculous features of the story were misunderstandings of actual events, he did not regard the stories themselves as conscious fabrications. Since Jesus was regarded as Messiah, it was not unnatural that the beliefs entertained about His career by His followers should be more and more

deeply coloured by Jewish Messianic ideas. These ideas in their turn had their roots in the Old Testament. The origin of the miraculous stories in the Gospels was to be sought not in misunderstanding and misdescription of actual events, but was due to the conviction that the Christian Messiah could not have come short of the ancient Hebrew worthies, nor could He have failed to fulfil the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament or satisfy the contemporary Messianic expectations. There was no cunning invention in this transformation of the actual events; gradually, without premeditation or concerted action, through transmission in oral tradition, the community refashioned the life of the Founder. Had the First and Fourth Gospels been the work of Apostles, this position would have been more difficult to maintain; but Strauss affirmed that the tradition of apostolic authorship was not sufficiently attested to override the conviction, based on examination of the documents themselves, that the narratives were largely unhistorical. The discrepancies between the Gospels, the difficulties inherent in the stories they relate, were exhibited by Strauss with a complete absence of reserve. The theory was not new, but the thoroughness and consistency with which it was applied caused a profound shock. The Christ of the Gospels became in the critic's hands a mythical figure with a very indefinite historical nucleus. All that genius and rare endowment could do for the task was done. He brought to the work a familiarity with the literature of the subject astonishing in a young man twenty-seven years old; great critical acuteness; a quickness to see and skill to pierce the weak spots in an opponent's argument. The book owed much to the brilliance of its style. Masterly in its handling of the dialectical weapons, with rich resources of irony and mockery, illuminated by happy metaphors, it rose on occasion to a stately and noble eloquence. Yet it was so preoccupied with destructive criticism that no clear, positive result emerged. Those

who took up the book, bearing the title "Life of Jesus Critically Investigated," with the not unnatural expectation of finding a biography, however retrenched, were doomed to disappointment. The author was so busily engaged in the critical investigation that he did not write the Life. In the preface to the third edition he said: "In the darkness which criticism produces, by putting out all the lights hitherto thought to be historical, the eye had first to learn by gradual habit to again distinguish a few single objects." But the explanation of the narratives put forward by Strauss raised a question which he failed to answer. The Life of Jesus, which, in the critic's judgment, had been lived wholly within the limits of the natural, was transfigured under the influence of Messianic theology. But how did the community come to regard Jesus as the Messiah and still to believe in Him in spite of His accursed death on the Cross? To what extent does this fact throw light on the personality of the Founder? How far can we argue back from the movement to the creative personality?

It lies beyond my scope to follow the turbid stream of controversy which had its source in the publication of this book.²⁰ It was discreditably violent on both sides. But notable criticisms were urged. Strauss himself made important concessions, but these were again retracted, after the invitation to a professorship at Zürich had been cancelled in deference to the opposition it excited. I must, however, pass over the refutations of the book and the author's own vacillations, that I may speak of a scholar

20. Strauss replied to his critics in his *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*, a brilliantly written, hard-hitting work. The first part appeared in 1837, the three parts in one volume in 1841. The second of his *Zwei friedliche Blätter*, which bears the title *Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christentum*, is very conciliatory in tone, serene in spirit, and exquisite in style. In it he claims that Jesus is to be ranked as the supreme genius in the highest sphere, that of religion.

and a critic of much higher calibre. I need hardly explain that I mean Ferdinand Christian Baur, Professor at Tübingen. I do not mean to suggest that the work of Baur and the Tübingen School was more epoch-making than Strauss' "Life of Jesus." Perhaps it was not. It would in any case be difficult to pronounce a judgment, and I hardly feel qualified to offer an opinion. But as to the qualities of the two men there is less need for hesitation. Baur had not the dash, the velocity, the brilliance, the literary gift of Strauss. But he was more massive, more thorough, riper in judgment, with a learning more deeply based and wider in its range, incomparably greater and more original as a master of method, fertilising and influential in the advancement of the subject as Strauss had it not in him to become. He was probably the greatest figure in the New Testament criticism that the century has to show. He moulded the subject for us as no one has done before or since; his theories are largely abandoned, but the problems which he set abide. To him we owe it that the atomistic way of treating New Testament problems has been left behind, and that not only is the literature treated as a connected unity but the literature and the history and the theology are realised to be an organic whole. He had been Strauss' teacher, and before the "Life of Jesus" appeared he had not only published books of great weight and learning, but he had already laid the foundations of the criticism with which his name will for ever be associated. In the noteworthy account of his critical development which he gives in his "Church History of the Nineteenth Century,"²¹ he tells us that he remained a quiet spectator of the sensations which the "Life of Jesus" produced. The book contained nothing new to him, for it had been written in his immediate neighbourhood and he had often talked it over with the writer while it was in progress. But he kept silence, because he felt that he was not as yet qualified to pronounce an opinion for or against

21. *Kirchengeschichte*, pp. 417—420; cf. *Dogmengeschichte*, 356—358.

it. He had been preoccupied with the Pauline Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles, and he had not yet made those deeper investigations into the Gospels which would alone have justified him before the bar of his exacting critical conscience in pronouncing a judgment. This he was first qualified to give when he had reached a conclusion as to the character of the Gospel of John. He pays a most generous tribute to the qualities which Strauss had exhibited in his book, and considers that in some respects he has done his work so effectively that it will not need to be done over again. But it seemed to him vitiated by a fundamental defect in method. This was, as he says in his work on the Gospels, that it gave a criticism of the Gospel history without a criticism of the Gospels. He did not blame Strauss for this, in fact he considered that it was inevitable at the time. Only after the character of the documents had been thoroughly explored was it possible to use them in the construction of the history; and until Baur himself undertook the task this preliminary work had not been done. He had not specially in mind the literary criticism. It was rather the intrinsic character of each document, the standpoint from which it was written, the tendency that came to expression in it, the end which it sought to serve, that must in the first place be determined. The author must be set in his own time, and his work understood in relation to its contemporary conditions. Then when this had been done it would be possible to determine its value as a historical source. The view which Baur reached with reference to the Fourth Gospel simply eliminated it as a historical source for the "Life of Jesus." But this made Strauss' tactics no longer possible. His method had been to play off the Fourth Gospel against the Synoptists, and the Synoptists against the Fourth Gospel. But if the Fourth Gospel was not, and never was designed to be, a historical record, then it could not be used to discredit the Synoptic narrative. This consideration did not of course prove

the historical character of the Synoptic narratives, but it removed one ground for suspicion. Yet it suggested the possibility that one or more of these Gospels had been written with a similar tendency. And Baur in fact went a good way in this direction. He found that the Gospel of Matthew contained practically his most trustworthy source, so that the task of criticism for the sake of disengaging the historical material was practically concentrated on that Gospel. Further, he held that Strauss' mythical theory was applied by him on a scale altogether too extensive. Once it had been recognised that several of the Gospels were tendency writings, then the action on the tradition of their particular tendency had to be recognised, both in modification of the old and in the free creation of fiction. In his new "Life of Jesus for the German People" (1864),²² which was much influenced by Baur, especially in the view taken of the Fourth Gospel,²³ Strauss, whilst speaking in the warmest terms of his teacher, will not admit that Baur had correctly described his tactics, and retorts that, if Baur was right in accusing him of giving a criticism of the Gospel history without a criticism of the Gospels, he could with the same justice or injustice reply that Baur had given a criticism of the Gospels without a criticism of the Gospel history.²⁴ Here Strauss put his finger on a very serious defect in Baur's work. He was so preoccupied with the documents as sources for the history of the time in which they were composed and the light they threw on the relations of the parties within the Church to each other, and their movement towards unity, that the reconstruction of the history itself claimed all too little of his attention.

In what I have just said I have touched on the main

22. *Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*; Eng. trans. *The Life of Jesus for the People*. I quote from the second edition.

23. Eng. trans., pp. 141—147.

24. Eng. trans., pp. 125—127.

position of the Tübingen School.²⁵ Baur had been led by his study of the Epistles to the Corinthians to the view that instead of the harmony that was supposed to exist between Paul and the earlier Apostles, there had been a controversy in which his authority was brought into question. This impression was deepened by a study of the Clementine Homilies. The controversy had left its mark on the Acts of the Apostles. His studies in Gnosticism led on to an investigation of the Pastoral Epistles, whose authenticity, he concluded, was impossible, inasmuch as their origin was to be explained from those party tendencies which were the driving force in the nascent Church of the second century. Deeper research led him to the conviction that the four chief Epistles of Paul, Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, were to be separated from the smaller ones, these being for the most part, if not entirely, non-authentic. The theory as fully worked out by Baur and his leading followers, notably, Schwegler²⁶

25. Baur's essay, "Die Christuspartei in der korinthischen Gemeinde, der Gegensatz des paulinischen und petrinischen Christentums, der Apostel Petrus in Rom" (*Tübingen Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1831), was the starting point for the Tübingen criticism. It was followed in 1835 by *Die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus aufs neue kritisch untersucht*. It was in this year that his *Die christliche Gnosis* appeared. During the next ten years he was mainly occupied with his massive works on the History of the doctrines of the Atonement, the Trinity, and the Incarnation. In 1845 he published his very important book, *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*, which was followed in 1847 by his equally important volume, especially for the criticism of the Fourth Gospel, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien*. His labours in this field were crowned by his *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* (1853). This and the *Paulus* have been translated into English. He defended his positions in a number of polemical tracts, and also wrote sketches of his own development and work. The very elaborate bibliography prefixed to the article on him in *Herzog-Hauck* may be specially recommended.

26. His chief work, *Das nachapostolische Zeitalter in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung* was published in 1846. It carried out the history in detail and over the whole early Christian literature and history as Baur himself had not yet done.

and Zeller,²⁷ was as follows. In the Apostolic Church there was a sharp division between the earlier apostles and Paul, the former being the champions of a narrowly Judaizing Christianity, the latter vindicating the universalism of the Gospel and the abolition of the Law. The struggle between these tendencies was the prime factor in the development of the Church, the two parties gradually drawing together till, with the exception of extremists on both sides, they coalesced in the Catholic Church of the second century. Five New Testament books alone were allowed to be of apostolic origin, the four Epistles of Paul already mentioned, and the Revelation of John, which was believed to contain a bitter attack on the Apostle of the Gentiles. The other books were ranged in chronological order by the degree in which the antagonistic or conciliatory tendencies were present. Mark was the latest of the Synoptists because in this respect it was the most natural. John was the latest of all the Gospels, for it reflected the final harmony. The Acts of the Apostles was also written from the Catholic standpoint to obliterate the inconvenient recollection of bitter hostility and substitute the more edifying picture of apostolic harmony.

I need hardly say that Baur's theory, widely accepted and confidently maintained as it was, was not destined to permanence. Its failure was due to no lack of talent or learning in himself or his pupils. If it could have been established they would have established it. It probably does him no injustice to say that had he not been a Hegelian we should never have had a Tübingen School. For the Hegelian scheme of thesis, antithesis and synthesis was that into which he fitted the development

27. His chief work, *Die Apostelgeschichte nach ihrem Inhalt und Ursprung kritisch untersucht* was published in 1854. He was Baur's son-in-law, and from 1842 edited the journal of the School, Baur joining him in the editorship from 1847 till 1857 when it was discontinued (see Baur, *Kirchengeschichte*, pp. 449f.). Subsequently, like Schwegler, he abandoned theology for the history of philosophy.

of Primitive Christianity. Of course he found facts in his documents to support it. He did not reconstruct the history by sheer intuition; one would indeed gather from his own account²⁸ that the theory was first suggested to him by his study of the Epistles to the Corinthians. But probably Hegelian influence even at that period of his career was sharpening his scent for antitheses, and leading him to interpret in this sense features in his documents which were susceptible of another explanation. As he pushed on with his researches he fell more and more fully under the Hegelian spell. The formula became a master-key with which he believed that all the locks could be opened. And thus, with abnormal sensitiveness to one factor in the development, the theory slowly became complete. The dominance of Hegelianism at the time provided the favourable psychological climate for it, and, although some of the most eminent New Testament scholars, and those by no means blindly conservative, never accepted it, it enjoyed a period of astonishing success. But the philosophy rapidly lost its hold in Germany, and this inevitably told on the acceptance of the criticism. The objections to it came to be more clearly realised the more closely it was investigated, and praise is specially due to Ritschl for recalling New Testament scholars to sounder positions. The chronological order in which the documents were arranged; the dates to which they were assigned; the stigma of pseudonymity affixed to many of them; had all been determined by the question, Where do they fit best in the scheme of development? In other words, the theory was brought to the phenomena rather than elicited from them. A more objective study has definitely disproved many of Baur's fundamental positions. The great majority of the Epistles which claim to come from Paul are now attributed to him by pretty general consent. A measure of doubt, it is true, hangs over Colossians, and

28. *Kirchengeschichte*, p. 417.

still more over II Thessalonians and Ephesians; but the only point on which there is a consensus of rejection among advanced critics touches the Pastoral Epistles, and even here there is a tendency to admit the presence of some authentic fragments. On the other hand, the point in which Baur agreed with tradition, in referring the Apocalypse to a Jewish Christian Apostle has been almost universally abandoned. Similarly the criticism of the Gospels has moved far away from Baur's results. An investigation into the literary relations of the Synoptists has convinced nearly all scholars that the Gospel of Mark was the first to be written, not, as Baur imagined, the last; while the Fourth Gospel has been brought back by a large number of critics from the middle of the second century to a date not far removed from the end of the first. The conciliatory tendency discovered in the Acts of the Apostles has also been greatly reduced in importance. The Clementine Homilies, to which Baur attached so much weight, are now relegated to a very subordinate position. And while it is not of course denied that there was a Judaistic conflict in the early Church, it has been dethroned from the sovereign position accorded it by Baur. Many other factors co-operated to create the Catholic Church. Moreover, Judaism itself was too narrowly conceived. It was more complex and held within itself more streams of tendency than Baur recognised. Nor did the controversy rage so long as he imagined, the triumph of universalism reached back well into the first century itself. The non-Pauline character of much second century Christianity did not spring, as he had argued, from any hostility to Paul, but from the inability of Gentile Christians to understand documents written by one who had been trained in Jewish scholasticism and who interpreted his new religion by categories taken over from the old. Finally, we must remind ourselves of Strauss' criticism that Baur had given a criticism of the Gospels without a criticism of the Gospel history, qualifying it, however, by the further remark that

his criticism of the Gospels has been largely proved to be wrong. The failure to deal adequately with the Person of the Founder and His career was a grave defect in the theory which set out to realise the programme that Baur had laid down.

The question may naturally arise why, in view of the collapse of Baur's theory, not in detail only but in its central positions, an epoch-making significance should still be claimed for him. It is, in the first place, because he realised the existence of a problem. The origin of second century Catholicism had to be explained, it did not explain itself. How did it come about that the movement, rising out of Judaism, had in little more than a hundred years, created a well-organised and closely-knit community on Gentile soil, predominantly Gentile in composition, yet with a type of faith and piety largely different from that of the great Apostle. Baur's answer to this may not have been, and indeed was not satisfactory. It remains his lasting merit that he put the question. In the next place he redeemed the treatment of the subject from atomism. His method was of the highest value because he insisted that the literature could not be understood apart from the history, and that single documents could not be treated in isolation from each other. He made it clear that a historical document was a valuable source for knowledge of the time when it was produced as well as for the time of which it told. And of course he added much in detail of permanent value. Since his time much work has been done on the New Testament in the departments of criticism and history, of exegesis and theology. In a sketch like the present the development cannot be followed in any detail. Even the bare enumeration of names that deserve to be mentioned would have to be far from complete. Yet I could not well entirely pass over scholars so eminent as Hilgenfeld and Holsten, Weizsäcker and Pfleiderer, Holtzmann and Schürer, Lipsius and von Soden, or to turn to those of a more conservative tendency

Lücke and Bleek, Meyer and Bernhard Weiss, Zahn and Erich Haupt. Nor can we forget younger scholars such as Jülicher and Schmiedel, Bousset, Deissmann, and J. Weiss, Wernle and Weinle, who had gained distinction ere the century closed and are happily still with us.

From the New Testament I turn to the Old Testament. Here the contribution of Germany has been very great, yet some of the most important pioneering work has come from other lands. The clue to the analysis of the Pentateuch given by the use of the Divine names Yahweh and Elohim was first put forward by Astruc,²⁹ a French Roman Catholic physician in 1753, though he applied it only to Genesis and the opening chapters of Exodus, and attributed the Pentateuch to Moses. Thirty years later J. G. Eichhorn,³⁰ in Germany, reached independently similar results. Geddes,³¹ a Scotch Roman Catholic, rejected this clue, but advanced beyond Astruc and Eichhorn in that he recognised that the Pentateuch could not be the work of Moses and that it was compiled from documentary sources which included the Journals of Moses. In 1802 to 1805 J. S. Vater published a Commentary on the Pentateuch,³² incorporating Geddes' results and splitting up the Pentateuch into a number of disconnected fragments. Shortly before this, in 1798, Ilgen, in a work unhappily never completed,³³ analysed Genesis into seventeen distinct

29. *Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux dont il paroît que Moïse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse*, 1753.

30. *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1780—1783.

31. *The Holy Bible, or the Books accounted sacred by Jews and Christians, faithfully translated from corrected texts of the originals, with various readings, explanatory notes, and critical remarks*, vol. i, 1792, vol. ii, 1797; *Critical Remarks on the Hebrew Scriptures corresponding with a new translation of the Bible*, 1800.

32. *Commentar über den Pentateuch*, 1802—1805.

33. *Die Urkunden des Jerusalemischen Tempelarchivs in ihrer Urgestalt, als Beytrag zur Berichtigung der Geschichte der Religion und Politik aus dem Hebräischen mit kritischen und erklärenden Anmerkungen, auch mancherley dazu gehörigen Abhandlungen*, Erster Theil, 1798.

documents, but he recognised that no more than three writers need be postulated to account for them, and thus advanced beyond the fragment-hypothesis of Geddes and Vater. In another important respect he adopted a sounder position; he accepted the validity of Astruc's clue. But he made an advance here by the recognition that two writers used Elohim, an observation which fell into neglect till Hupfeld rediscovered it in 1853. In 1806-7 De Wette, then six-and-twenty, published his "Contributions to Old Testament Introduction,"³⁴ a work of remarkable brilliance which secured a permanent reputation for the author, and for many years to come determined the attitude of most Old Testament scholars in Germany. He compared the history of religious institutions in the historical books with the laws in the Pentateuch, and he identified the Law book, found in the reign of Josiah with Deuteronomy. His comparison of Chronicles with the earlier historical sources led him to the conclusion that the Chronicler had revised the work of his predecessors in order to give the Law what he held to have been its actual place in the history though the earlier historians had ignored it. In other words, it was the late source which represented the Law as having been in force all along. The next important step perhaps was the publication by Vatke in 1835 of the first part of a work intended to cover the whole field of Biblical Theology.³⁵ No more than the first volume of the Old Testament section appeared, for the work was destined to win recognition only at a later period. Vatke was a Hegelian, and the fact that he anticipated in the most important point of all the now generally accepted critical view, has often been held to justify the opinion that the Grafian criticism, like that of Tübingen, was rooted in Hegelianism and will perish in like manner. That this is really not the case it is quite easy to prove. Reuss, the eminent Strassburg scholar, had a year or two

34. *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1806-1807.

35. *Die biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt*, Band i, 1835.

earlier hit upon the same conclusion, though he did not venture to proclaim it outside his class-room, and he at least was so free from sympathy with Hegelianism that the terminology of the school in Vatke's table of contents deterred him from persevering with the book. The great advance made by these scholars lay in this, that they recognised the late date of the Priestly Legislation. It was not till thirty years later that this opinion was revived by Graf. In the meantime Hupfeld³⁶ completed, in 1853, the work begun by Astruc a hundred years earlier, by his demonstration of two Elohist writers, in which he had to some extent been anticipated by Ilgen. Thus the recognition of four main documents—the Yahwistic, two Elohist, and the Deuteronomic—was now securely established. In 1865, Graf,³⁷ who had been a pupil of Reuss, revived the theory that the Priestly Legislation was late. His original statement was open to serious criticism, and received it. But before his death he revised it in deference to Kuenen's criticism, so that the problem was now stated in its true form, Was the Priestly Document the latest of the four and posterior to Ezekiel? Graf answered in the affirmative. But though Kuenen brilliantly vindicated this position,³⁸ it was not till the publication of Duhm's "Theology of the Prophets"³⁹ in 1875 that a German scholar came forward in its defence. It was in this year that Heinrich Ewald died. Although I have not mentioned his name in this sketch he had for long been the dominant personality in the ranks of German Old Testament scholars. In the dedication of his famous commentary on Isaiah, Hitzig had greeted his teacher as "the

36. *Die Quellen der Genesis und die Art ihrer Zusammensetzung*, 1853.

37. *Die geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments. Zwei historisch-kritische Untersuchungen*, 1865.

38. *De Godsdienst van Israel*, 1869-1870, and in articles in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*.

39. *Die Theologie der Propheten als Grundlage für die innere Entwicklungsgeschichte der israelitischen Religion dargestellt*, 1875.

new founder of a science of Hebrew language and thereby of the exegesis of the Old Testament." Ewald's work on the Prophets opened a new era in the interpretation of their writings. His massive "History of the People of Israel" has had no successor on the grand scale. But his work on the Pentateuch, while of course not unimportant was less significant, and his influence was thrown heavily against the attempt to make the Priestly Legislation late. His attitude was shared by his pupils, who numbered among them some of the most distinguished names in Semitic and Old Testament scholarship. In particular Schrader, the eminent Assyriologist; Nöldeke, foremost in Semitic learning and specially famous for his masterly treatment of the Priestly Code;⁴⁰ and Dillmann, renowned alike for Ethiopic and Old Testament exegesis; all pronounced emphatically against the Grafian view. It was, however, a younger pupil of Ewald, inferior to none in genius or in learning, who, after most important discussions of the literary analysis, revolutionised the critical opinion of Germany in favour of the Grafian theory.⁴¹ It is not without its touch of pathos that Wellhausen's "History of Israel," vol. i, known in the later editions under the more familiar title "Prolegomena to the History of Israel," should bear the dedication "To my unforgotten teacher Heinrich Ewald, in Gratitude and Reverence."^{41a} Since 1878 the theory has held its ground, nor in spite of frequent statements to the contrary, am I able to discern any indication that it is likely in its main lines to be

40. *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des Alten Testaments*, 1869.

41. *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, 1876-1877; *Geschichte Israels*, Band i, 1878. From the second edition onwards, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*. The English translation of the third edition was published under the title *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, and contained in addition a reprint of his classical article "Israel" in the 9th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

41a. *Meinem unvergessenen Lehrer Heinrich Ewald zu Dank und Ehren*.

abandoned. It must of course be remembered that the dating of the Priestly Code in the post-exilic period does not imply that all the institutions originated at that time. Far from it. The Code incorporates much ancient ceremonial, in many instances pre-Mosaic in origin, probably by many thousands of years. Certain features within it, however, for example the distinction between Priests and Levites, are later than the destruction of Jerusalem and dependent on Josiah's Reformation in 621 B.C.

On the development of criticism in other sections of the Old Testament I cannot linger. It may be said in a few words what the general results have been. The analysis of documents which has achieved such remarkable results in the Pentateuch has not left the historical books untouched. The documentary sources and the extent to which they have been used have been carefully investigated. The prophetic literature has been analysed with a similar care and some of the books shown to be highly composite. The very complex structure of Isaiah, the extensive editing to which most of the earlier books have been subjected, especially by the insertion of predictions of restoration or happy endings are among the leading features of more recent criticism. Here the names of Wellhausen⁴² and Duhm⁴³ deserve special recognition. Even if in the case of the latter it may be felt that the criticism is unduly subjective and governed by dubious presuppositions, and that he exhibits too great a partiality for dates improbably late, it ought to be as ungrudgingly acknowledged that his work in this field has been stimulating and suggestive in a quite exceptional way. But, as in the case of the New Testament, the number of eminent scholars is too large to permit of any adequate mention. To those who have been named I might add some of the

42. *Die Kleinen Propheten übersetzt und erklärt*, 1892.

43. Commentaries on Isaiah (1892) in Nowack's *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*, and on Job (1897), Psalms (1899), Jeremiah (1901), in Marti's *Kurzer Hand-commentar zum Alten Testament*.

more noteworthy. For sheer erudition and truly gigantic labours we should probably give the first place to Lagarde. An Orientalist not simply of the highest quality but of an astonishing range, he independently reached a theory of the Pentateuch closely allied to that of Graf. He toiled in many fields, but deserves our special recognition for his researches on Biblical and patristic texts, especially the Septuagint. Hitzig, too, was an Orientalist of great distinction, with a quite exceptional mastery of the Hebrew language, equipped for the difficult and somewhat thankless task of the commentator with tact and penetration and a subtlety which now and then became his snare. Defects more serious still were his dogmatism in matters where the data were too scanty to justify a conclusion, too much self-confidence, too wayward a judgment. A commentator better known to English students was Franz Delitzsch. While Hitzig was from first to last a rationalist, Delitzsch was an orthodox Lutheran in theology, and started from a very conservative position in criticism, though without the bitterness and inflexibility which characterised Hengstenberg. He was in fact associated with Keil in the production of an Old Testament Commentary, which was characterised by the firmest adhesion to tradition. But he came in the latter part of his life to realise the strength of the critical position and make concessions which were honourable to his candour if they did quite inadequate justice to the requirements of the case. He was a man of wide learning, especially in the post-Biblical Jewish literature. His commentaries had at one time a great vogue, but they answer very imperfectly to the more exacting demands of a time trained to expect a keener textual criticism and an exegesis more penetrating and detached. Of scholars who belonged to the more critical wing I must at least mention Stade, the editor of the "*Zeitschrift für Attestamentliche Wissenschaft*," who is best known for his "*History of Israel*," but who did much for Hebrew grammar and lexicography, for Higher and

Lower Criticism and for Old Testament Theology; Budde, whose work has been marked by exceptional suggestiveness and insight, and who has opened up new lines of research especially in criticism; Cornill, who, while doing much for criticism in both its main branches, has earned our special gratitude by his sympathetic exposition of the prophets, notably of Jeremiah; Kautzsch, the editor of Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar in several successive editions, the editor also of an important critical translation of the Old Testament, but who deserves special remembrance in an English lecture for giving us the best sketch of the History of Israel's Religion that we possess in our language; Gunkel, perhaps among all these scholars the most suggestive and original. I must content myself with the bare mention of other scholars on each of whom it would be possible to say much were there space: Nowack and Marti, Baudissin and Baethgen, Giesebrecht and Sellin, Baentsch and Bertholet, Holzinger and Steuernagel, Klostermann and König; indeed one does not know where to stop, and the list is far from complete. I must, however mention one phase of speculation which has recently attracted great attention. This is specially connected with the name of Winckler, the eminent Assyriologist, whom we have recently lost by death. Deeply impressed with the evidence for the early and wide diffusion of Babylonian culture, he has reduced Israel to little more than an intellectual province of Babylonia. He has constructed what he takes to be the Babylonian theory of the universe, and this astral mythology which, it must be remembered, has been reached by the piecing together of bits of evidence and which cannot be proved ever to have existed in antiquity, he believes to have exercised much influence on the religion of Israel and through it on the Old Testament. The theory is too complicated to be expounded here, but the kind of evidence by which it is supported is such as to inspire little confidence that it is likely to maintain its ground. Yet, in view of the

prominence which it has received in recent discussion, I could not pass over it in silence, especially as it is of course undeniable that Babylonian influence did extend over a very large area and persisted for a considerable length of time.

I may now take up once more the thread of the theological development in the narrower sense of the term. Five years after the publication of his "Life of Jesus," Strauss issued the first volume of a work designed to complete the task which the former book had begun. This bore the title "The Christian Doctrine Exhibited in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science."⁴⁴ The second volume, which brought the work to a close, appeared in the following year. As he had formerly attacked the credubility of the Gospel story, he now sought to undermine the whole fabric of Christian dogma. In the pungent paragraphs with which the introduction opens Strauss takes us back ten years earlier to the opening of the fourth decade of the century. Then it seemed as if the long quarrel between philosophy and religion had been brought to a close by intermarriage between the two families, from which alliance the Hegelian system had sprung. "The wisdom of the world, that haughty pagan, humbly submitted to Baptism and made a Christian confession of faith, while Faith, on the other hand, made no objection to grant her a certificate of full Christian character, and urgently recommend her to the loving welcome of the Community." But this naïve confidence was soon shattered. One could indeed see not a few lambs lying down with the wolves, and some ostensible lions making remarkable progress in eating straw. But others showed their claws and teeth and hungered for a better diet. Under the influence of Hegelianism Church doctrines were transformed and the Biblical history largely turned into myth; the ecclesiastical authorities and

44. *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt.*

theologians took alarm; and the Hegelian School itself split into a right and a left wing, of which the latter moved rapidly forward to a definitely non-Christian position, notably, in Feuerbach.⁴⁵ Thus while the principle that religion and philosophy were materially identical, though formally different, led to a conservative attitude towards ecclesiastical dogma in the earlier Hegelian school and the borrowing of Christian formulæ in which to express its own truths, as time went on and logic fulfilled its work, the real incompatibility of the two became clearer and clearer however loudly the orthodox Hegelians might protest that their philosophy was in no wise compromised by these irresponsible extremists. Strauss' treatise on theology cleared the air. The book was written with all the frankness and lucidity that the author had taught the world to expect. Like its predecessor, it rested on a remarkable width of reading not only of the negative critics of dogma but of its most representative exponents. The method of the book was deliberately chosen. It was largely an exhibition of the course which the history of the various dogmas had taken, for in that way he believed that the bankruptcy of theology could most effectively be shown. He expresses this in one of his striking metaphors, "The subjective criticism of the individual is a water-pipe which any lad can keep stopped for a time; criticism as it completes itself objectively in the course of centuries plunges forward like a raging flood, against which all locks and dams are of no avail."⁴⁶ His own work he compares to a balance sheet: it may make the firm no richer but it is quite as important for it to know just where it stands. This all the more that many theologians live in a fool's paradise and imagine theology to be in a perfectly solvent condition.⁴⁷ Strauss leaves them under no illusions as to the results of his audit. Right through, the Christian

45. *l.c.*, pp. 1-4.

46. *l.c.*, p. x.

47. *l.c.*, pp. x, xi.

doctrines are found wanting. And that not merely in their orthodox form, but as they had been transformed by more liberal thinkers. For his own part he turns them into philosophical abstractions, which could not be called Christian in any proper sense of the term. Rejecting the God of theology he accepted a spiritual principle; the Infinite seeks its realisation in the finite and attains self-consciousness in the human race. In his work "*The Essence of Christianity*,"⁴⁸ published in 1841, Feuerbach rejected this transcendental Absolute and turned theology into anthropology by asserting the Divinity of man. In philosophy he was a materialist. To this position it may be added that Strauss advanced in the work of his old age "*The Old Faith and the New*,"⁴⁹ which, it may be remembered, provoked Nietzsche to savage criticism. Yet, strange as it may have seemed to Strauss and Feuerbach, the Christian religion went on living and its doctrines continued to be expounded by men of high learning and distinction. It is customary to classify the types of theology under three heads. We have the Liberals, the Confessionalists, and the Mediating Theologians. Each of these schools possessed eminent representatives to whom I should be glad to devote a full exposition. But, within my limits I must content myself with the most general reference, and this is the less to be regretted that, in spite of their well-deserved reputation and the value of their work, they did not mark a new stage in the development in the same way as Ritschl, not to speak of Schleiermacher. All three types had been greatly influenced by Schleiermacher. It is true that there was not in the strict sense of the term a School of Schleiermacher. Those who are commonly recognised as such, for example, Nitzsch,

48. *Das Wesen des Christentums*. It was translated into English from the Second German edition by Marian Evans (i.e. George Eliot) in 1854 under the title *The Essence of Christianity*.

49. *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (1872); Eng. trans. by Mathilde Blind, *The Old Faith and the New* from the Sixth Edition.

Twستن, Neander, and Ullmann, stood a good deal nearer to traditional Christianity than their master. A more genuine representative was Alexander Schweizer, who was eminent for his contributions to the history of doctrine, and even more so for his exposition of Systematic Theology. He laboured, however, in Zürich more than half a century. He had here as his colleague for many years Biedermann, who, though not a Hegelian in the full sense, was yet of the more distinguished theologians of the Left the one who was most deeply influenced by Hegel. Pfleiderer for part of his career at least stood in a similar position, though further removed from Hegelianism and less inclined to Pantheism. Lipsius was definitely theistic and further removed from Hegel than either. Both he and Pfleiderer did work of the highest value on the New Testament and the early history of doctrine. Of the Confessional theologians I might mention Hofmann, famous alike in exegesis and systematic as one of the most penetrating and original scholars, but far less convincing than original; Thomasius, notable as an exponent of the History of Doctrine, but popularly best known as the first to put forward a Kenotic Christology; Frank, the author of the "System of the Christian Certainty"; and Hengstenberg, known for his violent ecclesiastical journalism and his strenuous opposition to a Biblical criticism which departed from tradition. Among the mediating theologians I may name Julius Müller, the author of "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," who was driven to explain the fact of sin by the theory of a non-temporal fall of souls; Rothe, one of the most striking figures in the theology of the century, but on whom I must not linger, though a treatise would be needed to do him justice; and Dorner, perhaps the most typical representative of this tendency, best known for his "History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," his "History of Protestant Theology" and his "System of Christian Doctrine." Kattenbusch puts together all these schools under the heading "Romantic

Theology," by which he desires to emphasise their connexion with Schleiermacher and to differentiate them from Ritschl.⁵⁰ In other words, however widely these schools differed, and the difference could hardly be overstated, they agreed in finding the starting point of theology in immediate self-consciousness. With this we come to Ritschl.⁵¹

It is far from easy to give any clear and at the same time just impression of Ritschl's theology. The three types of theology, of which I have spoken, suspended hostilities to unite against the new-comer, but while Ritschlianism evoked fierce antagonism, which it was not slow to meet in a like temper, it enlisted the enthusiastic adhesion of many among the younger theologians, including Herrmann,⁵² Kaftan,⁵³ Kattenbusch, Harnack,⁵⁴ and Wendt. Several of Ritschl's most distinguished followers

50. *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl* (1st ed., 1892), pp. 23—26.

51. Ritschl's life has been written by his son, Otto Ritschl, *Albrecht Ritschl's Leben*; he also writes the article on his father in *Herzog-Hauck*. The literature on his theology is large and increasing. In addition to the general works already mentioned, the following will be found of service to the English reader: Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology*; *Ritschlianism: Expository and Critical Essays*, together with the references in his *Christian View of God and the World*; Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology: Critical and Constructive*; A. T. Swing, *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl* (this includes a translation of Ritschl's *Unterricht*); J. K. Mozley, *Ritschlianism*; Edghill, *Faith and Fact*. German discussions are very numerous; it may suffice to mention Ecke, *Die theologische Schule A. Ritschls und die evangelische Kirche der Gegenwart* (on this see Harnack, *Reden und Aufsätze*, 1st ed., pp. 347—368); Lipsius, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*; Frank, *Zur Theologie A. Ritschls*; Pfeleiderer, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie kritisch beleuchtet*. Ritschl's chief works are mentioned below, pp. 171f. The following may be added: *Unterricht in der christlichen Religion*; *Theologie und Metaphysik*. A number of his minor writings have been collected in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*.

52. His most notable work is *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*. The English translation, entitled *The Communion of the Christian with*

had not been his pupils. They had been trained by mediating theologians, and, while not unmindful of their debt, found in Ritschl a satisfaction which their earlier teachers had not been able to give them. There is no Ritschlian school in the sense that its members agree in their general theological views; the school found its principle of union rather in a common method and point of view. There is in fact a wide divergence within the school itself on matters of the greatest importance. Ritschl was the son of a Lutheran bishop, and had been brought up in the staid, unemotional type of piety which one would expect in such a household. From this he broke away and fell under the spell of Hegelianism. For a time he was a member of the Tübingen School, and in 1846 wrote a book to prove that our Gospel of Luke was based on the Gospel

God from the fourth German edition in the Crown Theological Library, supersedes the earlier volume in the Theological Translation Library.

53. His chief works are: *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion*; *Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion* (Eng. trans., *The Truth of the Christian Religion*); *Dogmatik*.

54. Harnack's output has been colossal. His contributions to Church History, especially the early period, or to New Testament criticism scarcely concern us here, but the following works should be mentioned, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (the 4th edition has been recently revised and is now presumably in its final form; the English translation, *History of Dogma*, is from the 3rd edition); *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Eng. trans., *What is Christianity?*), also several of the addresses and essays collected in *Reden und Aufsätze*. Of these two are accessible in English translations: *Christianity and History*; *Thoughts on the Present Position of Protestantism*; and uniform with these is *The Apostle's Creed*, a translation of the article in *Herzog-Hauck*. An article dealing with the Apostle's Creed is printed in *Reden und Aufsätze*. The commotion which it excited in Germany may be gauged from the fact that the article was published on Aug. 18th, 1892, in *Die Christliche Welt*, reprinted as a pamphlet in a few weeks, and was in its twenty-sixth edition before the close of the year. A very bitter controversy ensued. Numerous pamphlets appeared; Harnack replied to Cremer's *Zum Kampf um das Apostolikum*, and his reply is also reprinted in *Reden und Aufsätze* from *Die Christliche Welt*.

of Marcion.⁵⁵ In 1850 he published the first edition of his treatise on "The Origin of the Old Catholic Church,"⁵⁶ in which, though with no little independence, he still accepted the Tübingen standpoint. The second edition, published in 1857, made it plain that he had definitely abandoned it. This book was one of the most important discussions on primitive Christianity published in the nineteenth century, and exerted a decisive influence on the later pursuit of the subject. Among other teachers he had been influenced by Hofmann and Rothe; and he owed much to Schleiermacher, in spite of the unfriendly language in which he speaks of his theological system. His affinities, however, were closer with Kant and Lotze. He had made profound studies in the History of Doctrine, the fruits of which are to be seen in his great dogmatic treatise⁵⁷ and in his "History of Pietism."⁵⁸

55. *Das Evangelium Marcions und das kanonische Evangelium des Lucas*. He soon abandoned the theory, and withdrew it in 1851. Baur maintained it for a time, but surrendered it later, though still affirming that Marcion's Gospel contained readings more original than those in Luke as well as deliberate alterations of Luke's text. The dependence of Marcion on Luke was demonstrated by Volkmar and Hilgenfeld; when, in spite of this, the author of *Supernatural Religion* revived the contrary theory, he was refuted so conclusively by W. Sanday that he abandoned it.

56. *Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*. It is little to our credit that no English translation of the second edition has appeared.

57. *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*. It was published in 1870, 1874 in three volumes. The first (Eng. trans. from the first edition by J. Sutherland Black, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, 1872) contained the history of the doctrine, the second volume (untranslated) the Biblical doctrine, the third the constructive part of the work (Eng. trans. from the third edition, edited by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay: *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation; The Positive Development of the Doctrine*, 1900). It should be remembered that the first three editions vary considerably. It may also be worth mentioning that it was Ritschl's original intention to combine the Biblical and constructive sections in one volume (see preface to vol. i). The third volume is not of course a complete treatise on Systematic Theology, but

One of the points which deserve to be placed in the forefront is that Ritschlianism was destined to meet a very difficult situation, the lapse from the Churches especially among people of culture, and in particular those who stood under the influence of the scientific view of the world. Ritschl believed the fault to lie largely in the way in which Christianity had been expounded and defended. Whatever differences may keep the members of the school apart they are united in the emphasis which they place on the fact that religion has to do with judgments of value. Ritschl's meaning has been hotly debated, and if he has been the victim of much misunderstanding the blame is scarcely all on one side. The question is much too intricate to be examined here.⁵⁹ Ritschl distinguishes religious from scientific knowledge or philosophy. Not that the objects of religious are less real than those of scientific

large portions of what would form part of such a treatise are included as "The Presuppositions." He says in the preface to the first edition of the third volume: "In order to make what is the central doctrine of Christianity intelligible as such, I have been compelled to give an almost complete outline of Systematic Theology, the remaining part of which could be easily supplied" (Eng. trans., p. vii). He comes nearest to a sketch of Systematic Theology in his *Unterricht*, intended by Ritschl for use in schools, a truly amazing book for such a purpose, but valuable for students of Ritschlianism. Frank sharply criticises the failure of the School to produce any comprehensive and complete work on Systematic Theology. He goes on to complain of corresponding failure in tone, Ritschl's tone often being profane and un-Christian, and in practical Christian service: "It appears that the sterility in the dogmatic sphere has its counterpart also in the practical. Ritschl's avowed antipathy to all Pietism and Mysticism, which is completely shared by his adherents, is hence intelligible" (*Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie*, 3rd ed., pp. 290—293). Kaftan and Wendt have since done something to remove the reproach of "sterility in the dogmatic sphere."

58. *Geschichte des Pietismus* (3 vols., 1880)

59. It is of course discussed in the works on Ritschlianism, but special attention may be called to Otto Ritschl's *Ueber Werthurteile* (1895); Reischle, *Werthurteile und Glaubensurteile* (1900); and Garvie, *The Christian Certainty amid the Modern Perplexity*, pp. 239—278.

knowledge, but we reach our certainty of them along other lines. The distinction comes out in a passage in the discussion of the Divinity of Christ, in which Ritschl contrasts the honour he pays to Christ as God by trusting for His salvation to the efficacy of His work, with the formula of Chalcedon. The former he describes as "a value-judgment of a direct kind," the latter as "a judgment which belongs to the sphere of disinterested scientific knowledge." The formula "Jesus has for the Christian consciousness the religious value of God," though not, I believe, actually used by Ritschl, sums up his position very well. It is not his intention to deny the real Divinity of Christ, though of course it still remains to be considered whether his conception of what the confession of Christ's Divinity involves is adequate. But he is concerned to affirm the practical worth of Jesus, as history and experience disclose it. Our belief in God is similarly a judgment of worth, not to be demonstrated by scholastic proofs, such as the time-honoured theistic arguments, which do not succeed in yielding us the kind of God adequate for our religious needs. An apologetic on old-fashioned lines is doomed to failure, and must be superseded by a defence more suited to the subject-matter itself.

On another prominent feature of Ritschl's work I have touched already. He was a great system-builder. He complained of previous theologians that in their exposition they traversed three separate points of view, whereas no system could be truly such unless the theologian occupied a single point of view throughout. What did not prove amenable to this treatment was in danger of being left aside. As a source for Christian theology he rejects everything that is external to it. He repudiates all help from so-called Natural Religion,⁶⁰ nor will he admit that we can

60. "But if anyone builds Christian theology on a substructure of pretended Natural Theology, the rationalistic arguments of Augustine about original sin, and those of Anselm about the nature of redemption, he thereby takes his stand outside the sphere of regeneration, which is coterminous with the community of believers" (*Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 8).

derive anything of value from Comparative Religion, except a clearer understanding of the differentia of Christianity. Schleiermacher and Hegel had recognised the affinity of Christianity with other religions, though they had regarded it as their crown. But for Ritschl Christianity was not, as for them, the finest bloom on a plant with many flowers, it did not grow from the same root or even from the same soil. Indeed it did not spring from the earth at all but came down from above. Nor could any expert knowledge, derived from the study of religion, enable one to place Christianity or to understand it. It was wholly unique and could not be judged objectively by the impartial spectator who boasted of the freedom from presuppositions.⁶¹ Such impartiality really did not exist, and what passed for it constituted the critic's complete disqualification. The religion could be rightly understood only from the inside. He says: "We are able to know and understand God, sin, conversion, eternal life, in the Christian sense, only so far as we consciously and intentionally reckon ourselves members of the community which Christ has founded."⁶² And again, "If we can rightly know God only if we know Him through Christ, then we can know Him only if we belong to the community of believers."⁶³ The nature of the Redeemer and the work He has done can be appraised aright only by one who has taken his stand in the community he has founded, and "as a member of it subordinates himself to His Person." We know Him to be God because we have found Him to possess this value for us. To quote once more, "We should pay no special attention to this purpose of Jesus, nor should we seek to discover its value and its meaning, did we not reckon

61. "The opposite view is one of the characteristics which mark that great untruth which exerts a deceptive and confusing influence under the name of an historical 'absence of presuppositions'" (*l.c.*, pp. 2, 3).

62. *l.c.*, p. 4.

63. *l.c.*, p. 7.

ourselves part of *the religious community* which first attested, through the writers of the New Testament, its possession of the forgiveness of sins as effected by Jesus."⁶⁴

But having attained this qualification, from what source are we to draw our theology? Not from the individual consciousness of the believer, a method fraught with all the perils of subjectivity. It is one of the most characteristic of Ritschl's positions that he insists on the priority of the community to the individuals who compose it. It is the community rather than the individual which is for him the object of justification and the benefits which Christ has procured are mediated through the community to its members. This community is not to be identified with the empirical Church. But, while it would be truer to speak of the communal consciousness as the source of theological knowledge, this might easily create a false impression. For Ritschl desires something more objective, fixed and not fluctuating, and this he finds in the Gospel.⁶⁵ It is the Gospel which alone creates the Christian consciousness, it is in it that this consciousness finds its guarantee. How then may we rightly determine what the Gospel is? For in history it has assumed many forms, all of them claiming to be the authentic reality. Ritschl's answer is that we must find our norm in the New

64. *I.c.*, p. 2

65. I follow Kattenbusch here, who thinks that Ritschl himself was not clearly conscious that this constituted the distinguishing feature of his theology as opposed to the "Romantic" theologies, and that he himself was the first to emphasise it (*Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, 1st ed., pp. 73—81). The emphasis on "the Gospel" as a watchword and standard is characteristic of Harnack. In the preface to the third volume of his *Dogmengeschichte* (3rd ed., Eng. trans., vol. 5) he meets the criticism "that in this account the development of Dogma is judged by the Gospel, but that we do not clearly learn what the Gospel is" by a brief epitome of what he takes the Gospel to be. His most recent statement is in the 4th edition vol. i, pp. 65—85.

Testament.⁶⁶ Not, however, that he based this, as had often been done, on a theory of inspiration. He reached his conclusion in quite another way. As early as the second century the pure Gospel had been contaminated by Greek Philosophy, and the History of Dogma had been warped from that time onwards. The pure Gospel had not been recaptured till the Reformation, the idea of Reformers before the Reformation he repudiates. Of course Catholic elements lingered on into Protestant theology, and these foreign elements are to be eliminated. Nevertheless the Reformers did recover the genuine Gospel and place the emphasis where the New Testament had placed it. But why should this unique authority be attributed to the New Testament, and in what sense is it an authority? Had Ritschl occupied the standpoint of pure Biblicism the question would not of course arise; but then his theology would have been very different from what it was. The traditional doctrine of inspiration he could not accept, for there was much in Scripture that did not command his assent. Accordingly he found the guarantee of the value he assigned to the New Testament in the fact that the Apostles understood the Old Testament and interpreted Christianity from that standpoint. Their view was not corrupted, as that of their successors, by

66. "It stands as the foundation-principle of the Evangelical Church that Christian doctrine is to be obtained from the Bible alone. This principle has direct reference to the original documents of the Hebrew religion gathered together in the New Testament, for the understanding of which the original documents of the Hebrew religion gathered together in the Old Testament serve as an indispensable aid. These books are the foundation of a right understanding of the Christian religion from the point of view of the community, for the reason that the Gospels set forth in the work of its Founder the immediate cause and final end of the common religion, and the Epistles make known the original state of the common faith in the community, and moreover in a form not affected by the influences which as early as the second century had stamped Christianity as Catholic" (*Unterricht*, p. 2). I quote the translation in Swing, *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, pp. 172, 173.

Greek Philosophy, nor yet by Jewish Rabbinism. But why, it may be asked, did not Ritschl content himself with finding the true Christian religion in the utterances of the Founder? Because we need more than they give us if we are to understand them. "Their significance becomes completely intelligible only when we see how they are reflected in the consciousness of those who believe in Him, and how the members of the Christian community trace back their consciousness of pardon to the Person and the action and passion of Jesus."⁶⁷ The New Testament is our only source for the knowledge that we are in need of, and Ritschl affirms that "it would be a mistaken purism were anyone, in this respect, to prefer the less developed statements of Jesus to the forms of apostolic thought."⁶⁸ Yet, as I have already hinted, he does not take the New Testament as it stands to be the norm of the Gospel. It is, as one might expect from the proof he gives of its value, the New Testament as it stands in continuity with the Old Testament and carries on the development which it initiated. Moreover, he lays stress on its practical as opposed to its theoretical contents. Lipsius expresses the following opinion: "In general, one might say that the normative character of Holy Scripture as a record of Divine revelation is not conceived by Ritschl essentially otherwise than in the whole of the modern theology which had its starting point in Schleiermacher."⁶⁹

When we have thus distilled the Gospel from the New Testament, we can employ it as a test of what passes for Christian theology. Thus we are enabled to disentangle authentic Christianity from foreign elements that may have intruded into it out of the New Testament itself or Greek philosophy or mediæval scholasticism or misdirected movements within the Protestant Churches or modern speculative philosophy. A return to the Gospel is imperative;

67. *Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. trans., p. 1.

68. *l.c.*, p. 3.

69. *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, p. 4.

dogma must be the natural expression of saving faith, all else is lumber. With this touchstone Ritschl was enabled to pronounce much that had passed for gold to be but spurious metal. He resolutely refuses to go behind the Gospel as it meets our needs and enter the realm of the transcendental. Thus the conception of God as the Absolute; the Christology which defines Christ as consisting of two Natures in one Person; the pre-existence of Christ, are swept aside by him. Whether true or not, they are matters with which we are not concerned and on which the Gospel has nothing to declare. The very order in which he handles the doctrine of justification and reconciliation is significant for his standpoint. The generally adopted order would be strictly chronological; to begin with the Biblical material, then to pass on to the post-Biblical development of the doctrine and on the foundation thus laid reconstruct the doctrine itself. This is not Ritschl's method. He begins with the history of the doctrine, and only in the second volume takes up the investigation of the Biblical teaching, and connects immediately with it the positive development of the doctrine as he himself reconstructed it. In this way he gave expression to his reverence for Scripture and sense of its unique value. I may add explicitly, what has been already suggested, that Ritschl differed from Schleiermacher in that he gave the Old Testament alongside of the New a permanent place in the Christian religion. The two stand in organic connexion, the Old is intended to lead up to the New, the New to consummate what is initiated in the Old. Among the world's religions the religion of Israel alone constituted a preparation for Christianity. Apart from it the Gospel cannot be rightly understood.

So far then I have been speaking of the sources from which our knowledge of the Gospel is derived and the criteria by which the authentic Gospel is distinguished from the false and liberated from the irrelevant. What then in Ritschl's judgment is Christianity? He gives a

definition of it which it is instructive to compare with Schleiermacher's. "Christianity, then, is the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical religion, which, based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and as Founder of the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, aims at the moral organisation of mankind, and grounds blessedness on the relation of sonship to God, as well as on the Kingdom of God." ⁷⁰ It is noteworthy, in the first place, that the ethical is set so firmly by the side of the religious. This corresponded to Ritschl's own temperament which was in fact ethical rather than religious. He insists on freedom, which is with him, however, a religious as well as an ethical idea, a conduct inspired by love, and the moral organisation of society as the goal of the religion. In particular it is characteristic that the Kingdom of God receives such prominence in the definition. The first volume of his work opens with the words, "The Christian doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation which I purpose to unfold in a scientific manner, constitutes the real centre of the theological system." But in the third volume he complains that theology has made "everything which concerns the redemptive character of Christianity an object of the most solicitous reflection. Accordingly it finds the central point of all Christian knowledge and practice in redemption through Christ, while injustice is done to the ethical interpretation of Christianity through the idea of the Kingdom of God. But Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle described from a single centre, but an ellipse which is determined by two *foci*." ⁷¹ The true reconciliation of the ethical and the religious elements seems to him the supreme problem in theology. For in religion we are conscious of our absolute dependence on God, whereas we

70. *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 13.

71. *l.c.*, p. 10.

are at the same time aware of our Christian freedom. The Kingdom of God is defined as "the uninterrupted reciprocation of action springing from the motive of love—a Kingdom in which all are known together in union with every one who can show the marks of a neighbour; further, it is that union of men in which all goods are appropriated in their proper subordination to the highest good."⁷² In the light of this idea of the Kingdom he determines the character of sin. He sets aside the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin, but puts in its place the idea of a kingdom of evil. The subject of sin is humanity as the sum of all individuals. Its real character can be understood only by comparison with the good, that is, the Kingdom of God. All grades of sin are recognised, but, apart from a possible final obduracy, which, as a matter lying within God's cognisance, does not concern us, they may be reduced to sins of ignorance. No propitiation of God is necessary since He forgives of free love. The work which Christ achieved by steadfast adhesion to His vocation in obedience to the will of God was that He founded the Kingdom. He thus exhibited the love of God in such a way as to remove from men's hearts the mistrust which they feel towards God. We must remember, however, that with Ritschl terms do not always bear their face-value. They may have a distorted or reduced significance. He emphasises love, but it bears in his terminology an unusual sense. He gives the following definition: "Love is the constant purpose to further another rational being of like nature with oneself in the attainment of his peculiar end, and in such a way that the one who loves follows in so doing his own proper object."⁷³ What is specially striking is the absence of any recognition of the emotional element in love. That is in fact very characteristic of Ritschl. The idea of fellowship with God is not recognised in the sense which the term generally

72. *I.c.*, pp. 334f.

73. *Unterricht*, 1st ed., p. 10. I quote from Eng. trans., p. 185.

bears. Herrmann's famous and often uplifting book "The Communion of the Christian with God" restricts it to the experience which we gain through contact with the historical Jesus. "We cannot speak of a communion with the exalted Christ."⁷⁴ Everything in the nature of Mysticism is abhorrent to Ritschl. Pietism is the object of his bitter and contemptuous hostility. That sober, moderate, unadventurous spirit would never have earned for itself the judgment of Festus on Paul. He may have done well to dislike sentimentalism, only people are too apt to dismiss as sentiment the most precious things life has to offer us. He sneers at the penitence of the Pietists or "their tempestuous prayers for assurance" as morbid exaggeration, nor will he allow any mystical union with the exalted Christ. No doubt there was much in Pietism that was unhealthy, as one can readily convince oneself by inspection of religious diaries in which the fluctuations of the pulse and the readings of the clinical thermometer are minutely registered. To such aberrations as these it was well enough for the healthy-minded theologian to say, Look away from yourself and your feelings to Christ as the channel of God's grace. Only some pity may perhaps be felt for one who wades where he might swim or is content with tramping when he might be soaring towards the sky. He says explicitly, "Love to God has no sphere of activity outside of love to one's brother."

His uncompromising opposition to Pietism was of course largely explained by the strength of his Protestantism.⁷⁵ He saw in Catholicism a rival and lower form of religion which had simply to be fought; schemes of reunion or compromise were vain dreams. His objection to Pietism was that it was an attenuated form of Catholicism masquerading as Protestantism. If Pietism prevailed in the evangelical Churches they could not permanently

74. *The Communion of the Christian with God* (Crown Theological Library), p. 291.

75. On this see Harnack, *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. ii, pp. 353—355.

maintain themselves against Catholicism. In judging his verdict we may usefully remember what he says of those who judge Christianity from the outside.⁷⁶

I have no space in which to trace Ritschl's own theology in further detail or to follow the progress of the School, to mark the wide variations that have disclosed themselves within it, or the cleavage into a right and left wing, the former approximating more closely to the general beliefs of the Church, the latter diverging more and more from them. But some words may be added which will also serve the purpose of touching on more recent developments. In the first place, Ritschl would probably have consulted his own reputation if he had left philosophy alone. He had far more competence for theology in which he was an expert of the first rank. One may discount Pfeiderer's judgment to some extent on the score of prejudice, but it was the verdict of a very competent judge.⁷⁷ And two further criticisms have been made. One may be expressed in this way, that, having turned philosophy out at the front door, he smuggles her in at the back; the other, that under the label of metaphysics he gets rid of truths vital to Christianity. In the next place, Ritschl lays his foundation in the New Testament, but just here he has failed to

76. Frank, with full recognition of the weaker sides of Pietism, protests against Ritschl's unjust depreciation (*Geschichte und Kritik der neueren Theologie*, pp. 34—39).

77. "On a closer inspection, however, this, his famous theory of cognition, is seen to be only a dilettante confusion of the irreconcilable views of subjective idealism, which resolves things into phenomena of consciousness, and common-sense realism, which looks upon the phenomena of consciousness as things themselves, admitting no distinction between phenomena as perceived by us and the being of things in themselves. . . . In spite of its intrinsic worthlessness, it is well calculated to furnish this theology, in its wavering between the subjective dissolution of the objects of theology and the affirmation of their objective reality, with an appearance of scientific justification having a certain attraction at least for amateurs in these questions" (*Development of Theology*, p. 183).

test the quality of his materials. From the first his interpretation of Scripture aroused adverse criticism. It has been widely felt to be far too much controlled by dogmatic bias. Moreover, while in criticism he was a great deal nearer the truth than Baur, yet there are important points in which he would not win general assent. And when we pass from criticism to theology, matters become more serious still. The New Testament, Ritschl held, was differentiated from the post-Biblical literature by its immunity from Gentile influence. The Apostles understood the Old Testament, and therefore interpreted the Gospel aright. Moreover, they were not infected with Rabbinism on the one side or Greek Philosophy on the other. But here a large and growing school would protest. The Fourth Gospel, the Epistle to the Hebrews, even the Pauline Epistles are declared to have been not a little touched by Gentile influences, by Greek Philosophy, notably Stoicism, and by the Greek Mysteries. This may or may not be true. Personally, I may express the opinion that at least with reference to Paul the influence has been much exaggerated. But I do not doubt its presence in the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, and even in this restricted form the results of research make Ritschl's position here difficult. Again, the Kingdom of God receives in his theology a dominant position. But the question was bound to arise, Did Jesus mean by the term what Ritschl believed that He meant? If not, then, however intrinsically admirable Ritschl's exposition of the idea might be, it ceases to express the idea of the Founder. And it is in the Ritschlian School itself that the sharpest expression has been given to the conviction that here Ritschl read his own ideas into the teaching of Jesus. His own son-in-law, Johannes Weiss, published in 1892 the first edition of his work "Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God,"⁷⁸ which expressed what has come to

78. *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* (1892). The second edition, under the same title, was published in 1900, it was more than three times as long.

be known as "consistent" or "radical eschatology" in its sharpest form. In the much enlarged and less extreme second edition he explains the origin of the first. He says that in the school of Ritschl he had become convinced of the exceptional significance of this conception which formed the organic centre of Ritschl's theology, and is still of the opinion that his system, and in particular this central thought presents that form of doctrine which is best fitted to commend the Christian religion to our generation, and rightly understood and expressed to awaken and to foster a healthy and strong religious life as we need it to-day. But he was early disturbed by the clear perception that Ritschl's view of the Kingdom of God, and the idea which bore the same name in the teaching of Jesus were two very different things. Further researches convinced him that the real roots of Ritschl's idea were to be found in Kant and the Illumination Theology.⁷⁹ In another respect Ritschl's position is attacked by those who have been formed in the school, I mean the attitude adopted by him towards other religions.

Here then, with a keen consciousness of the imperfect way in which I have accomplished my task and with a sense that even the best possible fulfilment of it under the conditions would have been wholly inadequate to exhibit the depth and richness of the development, I bring this lecture to a close. It is wholesome for us to remind ourselves how fully German the development has been and how little has been contributed to it from foreign sources. Our own theology, where it has not been too deeply limited by insularity to learn from Germany, has in the past greatly profited by its teaching. It might profit very much more. The more we borrow, the sooner we shall be able to begin repaying our debts.

79. P. v. He devotes to Ritschl's doctrine of the Kingdom the closing section of his lecture, *Die Idee des Reiches Gottes in der Theologie* (1901).

VII.—THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

BERNARD BOSANQUET, LL.D., F.B.A.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

GERMAN philosophy at the beginning of the nineteenth century lived in a world of mingled hope and despair, a world of daring genius, of spiritual adventure and romance. To-day it is environed by a structure of immense substantial achievement, where the conquest of nature through science and the opening of fresh horizons through mathematics seem correlative to the transformation of society by material and political progress. Its energy indeed is undiminished; but how far in its highly complex creations, bearing traces of the pessimism and positivism of the mid-century, either the old greatness survives, or a new greatness has come to birth, is what in these few pages we must attempt to estimate.

The task which I have incautiously undertaken is so impossible that in a sense it becomes possible again. To convey in a single lecture any idea of the detail of that immense and intricate structure of which we are to speak is plainly beyond possibility. More plainly so, as we approach the latter part of the period, when the immense intellectual activity of the German empire is supplemented by Austrian thought, and we find ourselves in the presence of a vast organisation of highly capable and energetic students, in continuous and many-sided co-operation, whose articulate detail no one but a working member of their body could expect fully to appreciate. But it may be feasible, in the few minutes before us, to express some relevant thoughts as to the rhythm and main direction of that great composite current. This at least is what I mean to attempt without further delay.

The rhythm and main direction, I said. Let us hazard one or two guesses at it, which by their several inadequacies

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may throw light upon each other. At first sight we seem to recognise the common triple rhythm, from which it is so hard to escape; the rhythm of creation disintegration and recovery; and in the end I believe that this simple scheme will be found in a sense to hold good. But if such is the rhythm of the movement, what is the main direction? Is it circular or progressive? Is it, for example, to be described as Metaphysic, Positivism, and Metaphysic again? This is what many of us would like to believe; say, for instance, in rough popular language, that the movement was: first, Hegelian; second, neo-Kantian or anti-Hegelian; and finally, neo-Hegelian. But the third term, at least, in this latter division, would be fiercely repudiated, I should suppose, by nearly all the German scholars of to-day; and even in the first term there would be an undue narrowness.

We shall be more cautious and more accurate if we start purely from the relation to Kant, which is fundamental for the German nineteenth century, and speak of the post-Kantian, the neo-Kantian, and, to invent a horrible term, which I will not use more than once, the post-neo-Kantian period. In this rough blackboard sketch the term post-Kantian would cover the time from the beginning of Fichte to the final recognition of Schopenhauer by the world, say from 1794 to 1844; the term neo-Kantian applies to the movement made explicit in 1865 by Liebmann's tract on Kant and the Epigoni, which raised the banner of the return to Kant, a phrase which came to indicate an anti-metaphysical crusade; and the term which I applied to the later neo-Kantian movement along with other contemporary developments might be construed with reference to 1888 and after, when Avenarius' critique of pure experience had suggested a return to constructive and systematic thinking, and heralded the appearance of affirmative speculation in many directions, including the latest neo-Kantian work itself.

These terms are relative to Kant. Now it is hopeless for

us to interpret Kant this evening. So the history must interpret him for us. That is to say, we must make the considerable assumption that whatever any serious school of thinkers have found in Kant, must in some sense and in some degree be really there. Thus while we devote no special passage to Kant, our whole discussion will be in substance an exegesis of him. And this is perhaps the safest way of interpreting great men.

But now, before I can go forward with our scheme, there is a comprehensive reservation to be made, which you may think nearly fatal. In the latter two-thirds of the nineteenth century there appeared a series of remarkable men whose attitude, so far as I understand it, could not be adjusted on the whole to the scheme I have indicated. And moreover they were the very men whose names might first occur to us foreigners in approaching our subject—distinguished men, such as Fechner, Lotze, von Hartmann, Sigwart, Wundt, Paulsen. It is a strange case. To some of these we owe, I suppose, what is most characteristic in modern psychology, for example, the idea of parallelism, which has even claimed to be more than psychological, and the whole new departure of experimental psychology; to others we owe excellent methodical work in Logic; to all of them, striking suggestions in special regions of philosophy. But, as far as I can judge, in philosophy proper they were all working a thinner vein than the great post-Kantians; and though for that very reason more popular at the moment, as for example through the picturesque idea of pan-psychism, they did not directly contribute to the central conflict of metaphysic and anti-metaphysic which marks the rhythm of the century.

For our purpose this evening then, our very meagre purpose, I think we must simply set them aside, noting in them, however, a certain growth of voluntarism, and also an intensification of the psychological attitude, leading by reaction to an emancipation from psychology, which

has had an important effect upon the central current of philosophy.

Thus we return to try and obtain a definite impression from our scheme of post-Kantian followed by neo-Kantian thought leading to the latest forms of the latter along with other constructive developments.

1. Let us place ourselves, to begin with, at the first movement of the new rhythm, at the source of the great current. Let us follow Hegel, at the age of 25, as he writes to his precocious friend Schelling, a youth of 20, in the year 1795, half-way through that last decade of the eighteenth century in which all creative influences seemed concentrating to make a new thing.¹

"From the Kantian system and its fullest completion I anticipate a revolution in Germany, which will start from principles already forthcoming and only needing to be systematised and applied to existing knowledge. No doubt there will always be something of an esoteric² philosophy, and the idea of God as the Absolute Ego will belong to it." Then, after referring to Kant's Critique of the Practical Reason, and to Fichte's Foundation of the whole Doctrine of Science (1794), he continues: "The inferences therefrom will one day astound a great many distinguished people. They will be giddy at the supreme elevation by which man will be so high exalted; yet why has the world been so slow to raise its estimate of human dignity (or value, a Kantian phrase), and to recognise the capacity of freedom (Kantian) which sets him in the highest rank of spirits." He is studying Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre; Schiller's Letters on the Æsthetic Education of Man, which had just appeared in "Horen," seem to him a masterpiece, and he is full of their language. Hegel's letter is revolutionary and humanitarian throughout. We

1. Hegel's *Briefe* (Karl Hegel), p. 15.

2. Esoteric, because it involved what would now be called the identification of God with the Absolute, an idea diverging sharply from Kant, and irreconcilable with the needs of religion in the strict sense.

know, of course, how the opposite of all this was imputed to Hegel in his later years. Nevertheless, this is the real clue to the system.

Here we have in a single focus the operative elements of the main post-Kantian movement. Hegel, we see, has no doubt whatever that he is creatively inspired by Kant, in pursuing Fichte's idea of the self as the key to the universe, while reinforcing it by the concrete æsthetic insight of Schiller and Goethe. This latter element, absent in Kant, came to Hegel in conjunction with Schelling's vision of a living concrete, as the revelation of a spirit at one with sense, and a world of reality in which mind and matter were only relative distinctions. In Hegel's own judgment³—I refer for a moment to what I have urged elsewhere—the deepest vein of philosophical inspiration ran from Kant to Schiller, and from Schiller to Schelling. It was in Schiller's re-creation of the Kantian æsthetic theory from letter to spirit, from fragments to a living system, that Schelling, in Hegel's opinion, found the secret of the Absolute. Schiller treated the question as one of liberating the spirit of Kant from the letter.⁴ According to the letter of his philosophy, Schiller observes, sense and reason, matter and mind, may be hostile, but in its spirit they are at one. "Now if man is free without ceasing to be sensuous, as the fact of beauty teaches, and if freedom is something absolute and supra-sensuous as its idea necessarily involves, then it can no longer be a question how man ascends from the limits (of time and sense) to the absolute." This is what the Kantian Schiller, blending his mind with Goethe's in that wonderful ten years, from 1790 to 1800, handed on to Schelling and Hegel.

Thus, in terms of the standard we have selected, the

3. Hegel. *Ästhetik*, i. 78, 80. E.Tr. (Bosanquet), p. 116. Bosanquet's *History of Æsthetic*, p. 286.

4. Schiller. *Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, Br. 25; H. of A. 290-1.

essential character of the post-Kantian movement is, so to speak, the forward interpretation of Kant; the sweeping away of distinctions and reservations, and repudiating all phenomenalism and all the subjectivism of the "As If." The world of a single experience, which Kant called into being, but had left anchored, as it were, to unknown external attachments, was now to be self-contained and self-supporting, like the solar system, without reference to any unfathomable beyond.

For comparison with later philosophy the attitude to the criticism of knowledge is fundamental. It has been said that the post-Kantian movement is based on a critical theory of knowledge as a science essentially prior to metaphysic.⁵ Now, if we mean that it accepted and built upon the analysis of experience which revealed its central and systematic unity, the contention is just. But if we mean that it accepted the idea of a criticism which should test the capacities of the intellectual instrument and ascertain their limits before proceeding to its use, such an epistemology is wholly foreign to the post-Kantian movement, and was always regarded by it as an absurdity. It is rejected by Hegel, in a well-known passage, as a method of learning to swim before going into the water.⁶ The whole point and bearing of the new way was to go straight to metaphysic, on the understanding that reality is everywhere and in everything, and that truth is to be attained only in the self-grounding and self-criticising whole.

We are to bear in mind then, in order to understand the rhythm we are following, that for this passionate and revolutionary movement the enemy is every form of the

5. *The New Realism*, p. 60, and *ib.*, *Introd.*, p. 20. Cp. Riehl, *Science and Metaphysics*, E.Tr., p. 137.

6. *Encycl.*, S. 41. For Nelson's comment, see *Acts of the Bologna Congress*, i. 266. A question might be raised whether Nelson gives due weight to the idea of knowledge being its own criterion, which I take to be the position indicated by Hegel.

inaccessible "beyond," the unattainable "ought," the unrealisable or fictitious "ideal," the asymptotic and unending progress to perfection. The movement embodied, we may say, the spirit of religion as opposed to, or as containing in subordination, the spirit of morality. For it the object of philosophy was "not remote, but in the fullest sense present"⁷; perfection was always to be realised, but none the less was the reality of things. The paradox thus resulting, the realisation of the real, was for those thinkers the very essence of life and of philosophy. It involves the attitude which is expressed in the highest teaching of Goethe:—

" Und so lang du das nicht hast
Dieses ' Stirb und werde,'
Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
Auf der dunklen Erde."

" ' Die to live '—for thou who hast not
Made this law thine own
Art but an embarrassed novice
In a world unknown."

German scholars of to-day would, I suspect, approve the poetry, but reject the philosophy. It is not my purpose here to argue that they are wrong; but if any of them should chance to see these words they will pardon the enthusiasm of a foreigner to whom the poetry itself comes as a greater thing when inspired with the argumentative passion of a generation of philosophers whose thought and courage were so high.

And now let us look for a moment at the character of the method or argument which formed the mainspring of this movement. Let us look at it with our own eyes, in its primary form, as Fichte states it in his first and second

7. Hegel, *Encycl.*, 94.

Introductions to the doctrine of Knowledge,⁸ where he reiterates his account of the matter, failing to see why anyone should misunderstand what seems to him so plain.

Intelligence, he says, is an action, not even an activity; *i.e.* it only exists in and by acting—it is, as might be said to-day, a function. The proper way to get to know it is to set it at work and watch it. You must *do* something; you must act or affirm. Then, and then only, you can see how, essentially, intelligence must work if it is to work at all, and again, essentially, what its working implies. “As long as”—these are Fichte’s words—“you have not shown the whole thing arising before the thinker’s eyes, Dogmatism is not tracked to its ultimate lair.” Or again, “The thinker institutes an experiment.” He sets the object at work, and traces the necessary connections of the phenomena, and what further conditions they involve.

So with the ego. He asks you to observe it acting; and you see, for example, that essentially it must have something to act on. The act involves an opposition; the affirmation involves a reality beyond itself. This is the only thing an affirmation as such can mean; it means that something is, independently of the affirmation. This is the kind of reasoning by which Fichte has been supposed to construct the universe out of the ego. It is, in essence, observing very carefully what is necessarily implied in the play of a certain function.

It is much the same with Hegel’s Dialectic, which owes

8. Fichte. *Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*. Werke, i. 440, “Die Intelligenz ist dem Idealismus ein Thun, und absolnt nichts weiter, nicht einmal ein Thätigkeit soll man sie nennen.” 443 ff, 454, “Er (der Philosoph) stellt ein Experiment an.” Cf. W. Wallace, *Prolegomena to Hegel’s Logic*, p. 125, “Instead of a glance at the secret substructure of the world, you see it [in Fichte] at a magician’s mandate building itself up; stone calling to stone, and beam to beam, to fill up the gaps, and bind the walls together . . . you are summoned as a partner in the work, etc.”

a great deal to Fichte, and a great deal to Kant.⁹ It is at bottom, I think, just the bare and fundamental appeal to the essence of all system and inference. Hegel may have talked rashly, but we have to look at the facts. It works like this. Begin anywhere in experience; affirm anything and let the mind work on the affirmation. You will find your affirmation confronted with another, different, but claiming the same place, that is, contradictory. Then, to satisfy your thought, you have to discover or contrive some further complex which will put both affirmations in their right place with the necessary corrections. The driving force is the necessity that the complex which your thought affirms should be self-consistent. All thinking and inference without any exception depends upon this principle.

It is quite beside the mark to ask where the matter of the affirmations comes from, whether from "pure thought" or from "experience." It all comes from somewhere; there can be no doubt of that; nothing comes out of nothing, and, apart from methodical explanation, this contrast is wholly meaningless. But the only question is, what you have to think true or real when you have got it before you. Before the court of Logic, the history of a proposition is not evidence, but mere hearsay. The question about any affirmation is how it now fits in with all that you are aware of beside it. Every affirma-

9. For appreciations of the dialectic free from the bias of the reaction see Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 369, McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 4, and Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, Book III, Part 1, ch. 2, sect. 20. Trendelenburg's famous criticism (*Logische Untersuchungen*, 1840—1870) belongs to the opening of our second phase—the reaction in full blast. 'Trendelenburg,' says Hartmann, "'means low-water mark in German philosophy,'" Wallace, *l.c.* Compare further with the passage above quoted from Fichte, and with the principle of Husserl's *Phenomenology*, F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914) p. 311. "The method actually followed (by Mr. Bradley) may be called in the main the procedure used by Hegel, that of a direct ideal experiment made on reality."

tion is modified as you combine it with others. Even in a common three-term inference the premisses modify each other, and the conclusion is a new system. Thus, once more, the method is one of ideal experiment. You survey strictly a certain complex, and you find that in principle it admits of only certain affirmations. The reason lies in the systematic nature of reality, made evident by the actual constructive work of mind, whose connexions are necessary.

The post-Kantian movement, as we saw, was in its origin humanitarian, revolutionary, æsthetic, socio-political, as well as directly and concretely metaphysical. Besides its basis in Kant, it owed much to Rousseau, much to the reviving interest in Greek art, politics, and culture, very much to the joint inspiration of Schiller and Goethe traceable to Winckelmann. It was strong, by the common consent even of a later day, in the sciences of humanity, in the theory of history and in the history of philosophy, in social ethics, in æsthetic, in the theory of religion. Its metaphysical logic, though furiously attacked by a later generation, at least aimed at being a system of the laws of reality, and in no way took the side of "psychologism," *i.e.* of identifying logical truth with mental occurrence.

Its weakest point, perhaps the main cause of what is held to be its downfall, was its philosophy of nature. Schelling and Hegel would have done better for their reputation with the world if they had never touched this subject at all; and Hegel in particular if he had never mentioned the name of Newton.

But their own reputation was not Schelling's or Hegel's concern. What they suffered from, and suffered for, was not a defect but an excess of interest in nature and science at a moment of singular excitement and suggestiveness in the scientific world. They incurred great perils; and they often tripped and fell. Their generation of naturalists was pregnant with the theory of evolution; Buffon and

Goethe,¹⁰ Erasmus Darwin, Treviranus, and Lamarck were on the track. Perhaps no philosopher with a passion for cosmic unity could at that crisis have kept his hands off the subject. The philosophers did not anticipate Darwin, but they did see a good deal of the unity of nature. Hegel remarked, for instance, that it could hardly be the goal of chemistry to establish forty or fifty heterogeneous elements.¹¹

The history of science has sharp turnings, followed by long lanes without much turning. A student who comes just before the turn, is soon and suddenly superseded. One who finds himself half-way along a lane inherits ideas which endure longer. We think ourselves in a long lane to-day, and we feel superior to those who were just before the turning. And yet in a hundred years some of our glimpses into nature may look as quaint as Hegel's. I do not doubt that his eagerness often led him to speak inadvisedly. But I hold that the philosopher is in the right to inform himself as he best can, and then to take his chances. A glimpse or two of truth matters much more than keeping oneself unspotted from mistakes.

However, to recur to the rhythm we are pursuing, the point is that the forward, objective, aggressive or adventurous interpretation of Kant's central unity came first in historical time—before the retiring, subjective, and, so to speak, defensive interpretation. The fact seems to me historically remarkable, and I do not know that it was inevitable apart from historical and cultural influences. The first phase, indeed, might call itself critical, if criticism means reading all factors of experience in the light of the whole. But it repudiated the critical attitude,

10. Wallace, *op. cit.*, 152.

11. *Encycl.*, sect. 334. Cf. Riehl, *Science and Metaphysic*, E. Tr. 110, "The advances in chemistry have by no means decreased the number of elements, as the systematic impulse of pure thought demands, but have increased it." I take it, as things stand to-day, Hegel in 1807 has the better of his critic in 1887.

if criticism meant the evaluation of a system, *prima facie* subjective, in terms of its power to reveal reality and truth. And this is on the whole the attitude of the second phase, which we now have to consider. It begins with the anti-metaphysical theory of knowledge. But we shall see that it leads to a third phase, in which a rather different relation to metaphysic appears at least to suggest itself.

2. It is impossible here to depict the historical and cultural situation in which the post-Kantian idealism together with the romantic movement lost its power. Great scholars have connected it both with the revolution of 1830, and with that of 1848.¹² Between these dates, and for some time after them, a materialism and materialistic social economics, which sprang in part out of the Hegelian movement itself, were superseding idealism; the natural sciences and Comtism were a rising force in Europe; and the pessimism and voluntarism of Schopenhauer, a genius of the post-Kantian type, though but now coming into his own, were impregnating general European culture with the influence, which, surviving in Nietzsche, was to be potent in the later half of the century.

The writings of Mill, Bain and Spencer had a curious influence in Germany.¹³ They were not, I believe, accepted

12. Wallace, *Life of Schopenhauer*, p. 190. Albert Lange, *History of Materialism* (E. Tr.), ii. 245 ff. The circular rescript from the Ministry of Education of 21st August, 1824, warning the academic youth against sham philosophy (i.e. non-Hegelian philosophy), compares amusingly with Hegel's letter above cited. Lange, l.c.n.

13. These writers are referred to at length in Lange's *History of Materialism* (1873) and Mill and Spencer are treated as examples of vicious "Psychologism" in Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (ed. 2, 1913), p. 78 ff. Husserl's criticism of Mill's psychologism seems to me thoroughly just. But there is one small point of terminology on which I think it probable that there is a misunderstanding. When Mill calls Logic a "Philosophy" or "Theory of Evidence," he means a theory of proof, not a theory of "self-evidence" or of the quality of being "evident," which I take to be the meaning of the German word "Evidenz." "Evidence" for us means facts or testimony alleged in

as profound by thinkers of repute; but they were, as, somewhat to our surprise, they remain even to-day, a convenient text for criticism, and filled men's minds with the idea of an inductive, phenomenal and psychological philosophy.

It was under influences like these that in 1865 Otto Liebmann¹⁴ published his tract entitled, "Kant und die Epigonen," the sections of which, dealing in succession with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Fries, and Schopenhauer, ended severally with Liebmann's watchword, "We must go back to Kant." The test he applied to all these thinkers was the problem of the thing-in-itself,¹⁵ the removal of which, as an inconsistency in Kant's philosophy and a mere excrescence upon it, appeared to him essential to a true appreciation of the system. He held that all these philosophers had in some way compromised with the accursed thing; Herbart being so far at one with Hegel that even in his pluralist system of "reals"

support of a proposition. And Mill means by the "Theory of Evidence" or "larger Logic," (*Examination of Sir W. Hamilton*, 457, 461) practically his theory of Induction as opposed to Formal Logic. If, as I imagine, the word "Evidence" on p. 181, Husserl *op. cit.*, is taken in the same sense as "Evidenz" on p. 189, then I incline to think that in this trifling particular Mill is misunderstood. Partly because of the difference of usage I have referred to, "Evidenz" is a very difficult term for an Englishman to understand. I should think the best rendering is "self-evidence." In Mill's controversy with Whewell, he develops a non-psychological theory of evidence in his sense of the word, which seems in the main sound. See my *Logic*, ii, 226-9.

14. "Otto Liebmann," *Kant u. die Epigonen*, 1865, "zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit," 1876. His attack on Hegel's handling of mathematics is in the later work.

15. Külpe in *Realisierung* (1912) accepts, as I understand, the Thing-in-itself. "Wir halten mit dem ein Ding an Sich und seine Beziehung zur Erfahrung anerkennenden Kant," i. 251. He means, I gather, something like the "physical object" of science. Still, the comparison of his position with Liebmann's is instructive for the development of the reaction into its sequel.

(simple underlying qualities) he had set up a transcendent something, beyond space and time. The only way therefore was to go back to Kant and make a fresh start.

Liebmann treated it as a paralogism even to argue that our world in space and time is phenomenal. It is conditioned, he would allow, but self-conditioned; not conditioned *ab extra*; and he denied Herbart's principle, "So viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung auf Sein." So far as I can see, his successors did not imitate his thoroughness, but admitted for the most part that our world is phenomenal of the unknown.

He anticipated, however, a very important feature in later philosophy, by insisting on the philosophical value of mathematics; and his special hostility to Hegel was expressed in a contemptuous criticism of the Naturphilosophie directed to this point.

Here, then, as Liebmann clearly proclaimed, the critical philosophy falls back into a criticism of knowledge. It limits itself to what is given in consciousness and occupies itself on this basis with examining the range of our cognition and the limits of our intelligence, much like Locke.

Thus, in the general neo-Kantian position, we have the contradictory opposite of the post-Kantian reading of Kant. That was a metaphysic; this is an epistemology. And Epistemology, Theory of Cognition, Criticism of Knowledge, remain, I think, on the whole the attitude of the most progressive German thought from that day to this. There is, indeed, a later change in its focus, which will justify the distinction I have indicated between the second and third phases of the intellectual rhythm which we are studying. But the neo-Kantian mode of approach seems to me to characterise on the whole both the second phase which we are describing, and the third which we shall indicate below. Criticism has returned into its shell; it takes its stand on the given *in* consciousness; and considers what further, if anything, you can elicit from that.

At once, therefore, there re-appear those Kantian features which post-Kantian thought had more especially repudiated; the unrealised and unrealisable ideal in the mind, the ever unattainable "ought," the infinite process of approximation to moral perfection. In Liebmann, Vaihinger, Lange, and the Marburg school, we find this view maintained with extraordinary skill and tenacity, and, by Vaihinger in particular, attributed with an elaborate array of evidence from posthumously published works, to Kant himself. That is to say, for example, in the Kantian treatment of God, Freedom and Immortality, we are not, if we respect the spirit of Kant, to go forward in any sense or manner to incorporate or include these features in an objective theory of the universe; but we are to regard the familiar "as if" with which Kant conditions them as we regard a conscious working fiction in any special science, say, the fiction of dealing with a curve as composed of very short straight lines. The thing is a fiction and known to be a fiction; it is received purely for its value as a practical rule, and not as having any relation to theoretical truth. The "as if" is simply to tell you in what way you are to act if you wish to follow the ideal in your mind. The ideal has no objectivity or reality of any kind, except that it arises in your consciousness and you cannot get rid of it.

This view of the ideal, which to Hegel seemed self-contradictory and already obsolete, finds of course a strong support, previously undreamed of, from all those modern views which point to an unlimited horizon of change for the future of our universe, and to a practical rather than a theoretical function for knowledge. The tables seem to be turned on the post-Kantian doctrine when absolutism is treated as analogous to a geocentric hypothesis,¹⁶ and the

16. For this comparison, and the whole defence of the "Sollen" against Hegel, see especially Natorp, "*Kant und die Marburger Schule*" (1912). Vaihinger interprets the "As If" with extraordinary ingenuity

Kantian ideal is likened to the true modern conception of a freely moving planet. The unending progress, the fundamental antithesis of the real and the ideal, is just what these views seem to demand.

A remarkable consequence of this critical attitude in the epistemological sense is the difficulty of distinguishing the cognitive theories, whose names still carry some philosophical significance, from each other. "Critical" or "Idealistic Positivism," the doctrine of Vaihinger and I presume of Mach (*cf.* the title "Anti-metaphysical Prolegomena" in his work of 1886, *Analyse der Empfindungen*), "Critical Realism," the doctrine of Riehl, "Critical Idealism," the ultimate doctrine of Albert Lange in his famous history of Materialism—these theories, all alike anti-metaphysical, are hardly by any precise philosophical standard distinguishable from each other.¹⁷ In truth, Critical Realism and Critical Idealism at this time are much more like each other, than each of them is to its

in terms of the "Sollen." Fictions are for him a mere expression of the ideal, with no objective warrant, yet ineradicable. Lange takes a similar line. It is really the moral attitude made absolute.

17. See Külpe *Realisirung*, 103. Neither the earlier critical idealist nor the earlier critical realist holds together the entire experienced world as the reality. This is, for example, Schuppe's complaint against the prevailing critical realism, in his "*Bestätigung der naiven Realismus*" (reprinted in Avenarius' *der Menschliche Weltbegriff*). Therefore, as one is seldom quite certain that the idealist or positivist has not a thing in itself in the background (as Vaihinger clearly has—an unknowable real), and as the realist of Riehl's type makes his reality rather like a thing in itself (for you cannot get at it with any completeness) there is little to choose between them but a difference of emphasis; again, however, when you come to compare, say Cassirer and Husserl (Idealists) with Külpe (Realist) you find in both groups a fairly comprehensive view of organised experience, and the main difference is merely in the realist's conviction that certain objects are independent of mind. I do not see that Külpe's conception of an Inductive metaphysic has necessarily to do with Realism. It seems to me clear, however, that Induction can only operate *within* a metaphysical position.

successor of the same name. One might find the principal watchword of the earlier or positivistic attitude in the phrase "pure experience." In what you are to find the pure experience, and what you can elicit from it, are points on which differences may exist. But that what you have in consciousness unadulterated by beliefs about the beyond, is the sole trustworthy datum, appears to be at starting the universal critical postulate. At starting, because it modifies itself in working out.

To obtain a distinct impression, let us consider in this connection the ideas of *Vaihinger*, than whom, I suppose, there is no more competent Kant-philologist. His remarkable book, "*The Philosophy of the As If*" was written, as we all know, in 1876-7, but partly because the ideas of the day were not ripe for it, was not published till 1911. Thus it embraces a long period of time; we have in it the author's views of 1877, copiously confirmed and illustrated by ideas of the 80's and 90's, including, as he points out, Voluntarism, the biological theory of cognition as an adaptation subserving economy of thought, Nietzsche's recognition of the value of fictions, and Pragmatism in its more critical aspect as a protest against one-sided intellectualism. In view of all these influences, we may summarise *Vaihinger's* neo-Kantianism as follows.

Nothing in our experience is real but sensations in their successions and co-existences. Possible sensations are included. All the constructive elements of our world, the Categories, Number and mathematical ideas in general, Things, Subject and Object, and indeed our experience as an organised world, are without exception Fictions. By "fictions," however, he does not mean mistakes or illusions; and here he believes himself to have a new point of view, that of the high value of fictions. A fiction is a working rule, contrived consciously or unconsciously as a guide or facilitation to action, that is, to procuring sensations. It is expressed through an analogy, an "as if." And the whole world, as it is in our ideas, is an instrument

contrived for this purpose, and makes no pretence to be a copy of reality, though it is a means by which we adapt our action to the real, a real in its own character unknown. The whole world, as it is in our ideas, lies between the afferent and the efferent nerve (compare Bergson), and its office is simply to make the communication between them more adequate. Science indeed does at times make the intellectual constructions thus arising an end in themselves; then they become a luxury and a passion; "and all that is noble in man has an origin like this."¹⁸

Thus it is a fundamental error to treat knowledge as if it aimed at copying the real world. The world as it is in our ideas is itself a cosmic product, generated by the instinct of the psyche through analogous apperception, to facilitate practice. Real being is unknowable, not because it is above our understanding, but because it is below it. The world of our experience is a *product* of the real world; it cannot possibly be a *copy* of it. It is, Vaihinger seems to imply, a higher phase of it.

This conception, and the conception of the high value of fictions, which at the same time are always self-contradictory, might lend themselves to quite other philosophical theories. The main idea of sensational reality we need not criticise; but these accessory interpretations breathe new life into it. Our world, it would almost seem, is an improvement on the "real" world. Thus when the idea of fiction is applied to mathematics as a whole, its implication of a purposive construction possessing supreme value for the ordering of reality does much to remove what is *prima facie* a fundamental contradiction between Vaihinger and thinkers within the same movement, for whom mathematics is the clue to all knowledge.

Only, it does still seem as if for him a fiction has its value in its fictitiousness. And so it has, no doubt, but only as a short cut has its value in its shortness. After

all, it must be between the right places, and that is determined by its relation to reality.

Now I cannot see that the situation is changed in principle so long as the epistemological point of view is retained, along with the assumption that our world of perception is phenomenal. The emphasis may be changed from the sensations in combination and succession to the formulæ of the succession and combination of the sensations, so that in effect a recognition of a systematic world may appear within the phenomenal course or may be employed in an inference beyond it. But until pure experience is interpreted from a less psychical standpoint, the conception of a real world cannot be genuinely entertained.

Thus I cannot help thinking that Mach and Riehl, for instance, are fixed in the former attitude, so that critical realism and critical monism, the doctrines of Riehl,—“critical” as a prefix means, I think, in this period “anti-metaphysical”—do not effectively go beyond the positivism of Mach. On the other hand, a relatively new attitude appears to me to begin with Richard Avenarius.

3. Here, then, with Avenarius' *Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung* (1888) and his “*der Menschliche Weltbegriff*,” (1891), I venture to see the beginning of the third phase of the rhythm we have been tracing.¹⁹ Of course these assignments of place and time, in the vast co-operation of students to which I referred at starting, are not much more than symbolic. One can say that the features I speak of were apparent here; one can hardly say that they were not

19. Cf. Külpe's *Realisirung*, p. 114 (referring to the 80's of last century), “Seitdem hat sich unsere Stellung zur vorgefunden Wirklichkeit immerhin merklich geändert” [Wirklichkeit=what is actual in consciousness], “Wir sind wieder im Begriff, uns ein ideales Reich zu erschliessen, ein Reich das nicht von dieser Welt des Bewusstseins ist.” “Metaphysik ist kein verächtlicher Schlagwort mehr.” The “ideales Reich” is, I take it, the realm of things as known to science [“real” as opposed to “wirklich”].

previously apparent at all elsewhere. The Marburg school, for instance, to which I shall refer below, had already been at work from the earliest neo-Kantian period.

In any case, what I seem to observe at least from this point onwards, is a systematic and logical crystallisation, a solidifying or architectonic tendency, so to speak, within the critical and epistemological position. The anti-metaphysical attitude lingers on, but tends to pass into an attitude rather *preliminary* than hostile to metaphysic. Cognisance is taken of the distinction between what is given *in* consciousness and what is given *to* consciousness. Mathematics asserts itself as a great fountain of necessary construction and non-psychical truth. Logic and essential necessity recover their value in contrast with psychological fact. For all these things precedent can be found in Kant, Herbart, and Lange,²⁰ and considering our pregnant interpretation of the significance of fiction, even in Vaihinger, who may seem most opposed to them. To gain, once more, a vivid impression, let us look, in the first instance, at the essential position of Avenarius.

Avenarius' watchword is still pure experience; pure experience means for him what comes from our surroundings; and it is the destiny of all ideas which are not pure experience to vanish like primitive animism from human thought, and make way for what is. That is the side of the epistemological tradition which he retains.

But, on the other hand, two things are noticeable. His pure experience is always a system in itself, implying a central term and its surroundings or counterparts. Without a co-ordination of this kind there is no experience. And the experience is not psychical more than physical. The assumption that we begin from something psychical, inward, ideal, and build up the physical world out of or on the basis of this, is for him a fallacy with a perfectly definite origin—the fallacy of Introjection. Introjection,

20. Cf. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1913, i. 213 ff, 224 ff.

as I understand it, is simply the familiar tendency of each of us to say to his neighbour, "*I* am dealing with perceptible facts; *you* are dealing with your inward impressions." Then, on reflection, we transfer to ourselves what we have affirmed about our neighbours, and the thing is done. We are no longer a central term in a world of counterparts—a necessary element in a world inseparable from us, but we have become a sort of vessel containing airy and unreal images, out of which we ineffectually struggle to elicit a physical reality beyond them.

All this, according to him, is sophistical and superfluous. Experience is what it is, an actual system of counterparts, all of which, ultimately and in principle, have the power of being central members, what we should call percipients, in a complex of such counterparts. To go behind this arrangement, and ask what any term would be "in and for itself" is self-contradictory. You must not answer, "The cinnabar in itself is neither red or black"; nor must you answer, "We do not know what colour it is in itself." In either answer you assume something unthinkable, viz., a term which is not a counterpart in the system of pure experience.

Thus it is worth observing that in the latter part of his *Weltbegriff* he substitutes for the term "pure experience" the term "full experience," meaning by the latter an experience in which none of its inseparable conditions—*e.g.* the presence of the human body and its surroundings, are overlooked. Hence in his philosophy both the psychical and the abstract nature which we have seen ascribed to the real experience disappear; and Psychology, in his view, is not merely Psychology without a soul, which had been a familiar idea since Albert Lange, but Psychology without a distinction between the physical and the psychical. The object of Psychology is any experience regarded from the point of view of the individual whose "statement" it is. The ego has more things in it than a tree has, and that is all. Of course in all this we

have only the substitution of function for substance which may be traced back to Lotze, Hegel and Kant, and which in a highly explicit form gives the title to a considerable work of Cassirer, "*Substanz-Begriff und Functions-begriff*." Its point for us here is in the democratic equality, so to speak, which it is used to introduce into the world of experience, giving the idea of mind as constituted by the world, no less than the world, in Kantian or post-Kantian phrase, as constituted by mind. We feel ourselves getting back to a solid system of things, which yet is free from the implications of the Thing in itself. It is to be noted as essential to this position that a given constituent can be constituent of the surroundings of more than one person. We have therefore a genuinely unitary world.

This "empirio-criticism," as Avenarius called it, which he took to be one with man's natural idea of the world, we may set down, I presume, with Schuppe, as meant to be a naïve Realism. Schuppe complains that he himself wanted to be a naïve Realist, but everyone would set him down as a subjective Idealist.

But we find no less of what we are looking for in Cassirer's fascinating work, to which I have just referred, although *his* explicit position is that of "Critical Idealism." It illustrates the force of the anti-metaphysical tradition that he *prima facie* identifies the "metaphysical" attitude with that of transcendental realism—with the old attitude of the *salto mortale* from subjective data to transcendent being, which we on our part have rather held that epistemology implies and true metaphysic repudiates. And yet, in his own doctrine, we find the greater part of what a genuine metaphysic would demand. The preface indeed shows him to be aware that he is handling metaphysical questions. The novelty and interest of his position is, that in harmony with the neo-Kantian tradition, and especially that of the Marburg school to which he belongs, it is mathematics which furnishes him

with the ideas, which come to the post-Kantian rather from the organic universal. For him as for all Hegelian logic, the enemy is the method of forming universals by abstraction, with the view of retaining impoverished sensuous elements as a generalised picture or copy of the real world, with the old result expressed in the inverse ratio of intension and extension. And the method which he opposes to this is the further determination of sensuous data by mathematical formulation of their conditions, such that not general resemblances but necessary connections of differences, in series and complexes of series according to law, give the true relation of universal and individual; with the result that intension and extension increase *pari passu*, because increased intension means more complex articulation and a wider nexus of terms.

Thus he again, like Vaihinger, starts from the fundamental principle that not copying, but construction according to law, is what is aimed at in knowledge. And his identification of reality with the comprehensive determination of the datum through the precise articulation which locates it in the whole system, shows us, surely, the criticism of knowledge expanding into the realm of metaphysic, and often seems to repeat almost literally the contentions²¹ of a philosophy whose inspiration is of organic and post-Kantian origin.

It is also noteworthy that while quite free from any tendency to reduce logical and metaphysical necessity to psychological fact, Cassirer rejects (so I understand him) the extreme view of Mr. Russell, that the conception of mind is wholly irrelevant to that of logical and mathe-

21. Cf. e.g. T. H. Green, *Works*, ii, 288. "From the connection of any set of phenomena as merely resembling, no science results; once connect them as constituents of a quantity, and we have the beginnings of science." The conception of a universal as constituted not by resemblances but by a system of differences came to earlier philosophy, e.g. to Plato and Hegel, from the idea of an organism, as to Cassirer from mathematics.

matical truth and necessity. Spontaneity of thought, as I gather from Cassirer, is correlative to objectivity, and the separation between ideal truth and real existence, though important, cannot be ultimate.

In all this, I submit, the criticism of knowledge, which shrank into its shell in the second phase of the century's thought, is beginning to organise and solidify itself, and to expand into a true immanent metaphysic—a metaphysic which treats experience as *ab initio* and in principle in touch with reality.

And we may note the same tendency in the important theory of act, content, and object which a number of thinkers, mostly but not solely German, have developed in detail during the later years of the nineteenth century. The distinction between what is given *in* consciousness and what is given *to* it is of course not new,²² but as worked out in detail it makes impossible a set of misapprehensions which have been a serious hindrance in the way of a reasonable treatment of reality. To say that the world is my idea, if that means a sheer psychical state of my consciousness, or an adjective of myself, should henceforward be impossible.

Again, developing out of descriptive psychology, though not identical with it, we now have a methodic treatment of essential distinctions and connections given within existent experience itself, of which essential truths an elementary type is proffered in such a proposition as that a sound is not a colour, or that a spatial object, so long as it remains a spatial object, can only be perceived through a variety *ad infinitum* of gradations and nuances,

22. Cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 301. On "Akt," "Inhalt," and "Gegenstand," with special reference to Meinong, compare Stout, *Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge*, Glasgow, 1911. See, however, Husserl, *Jahrbuch*, 1913, i, 287. Natorp (*Kant. u. d. Marburger Schule*, p. 16) contends that "Inhalt" and "Gegenstand" are relative, so that what was "Gegenstand" can become "Inhalt" towards a further "Gegenstand." This seems to me important.

depending on the spectator's point of view. No God could make it perceptible otherwise.²³ Or again, a precise relation is determined between the "physical thing"²⁴ and the thing of sense-perception—answering the question whether or no they are in the same world; and this is a matter of great importance for the starting point of metaphysic.

Truth of this kind, *a priori* truth, may be obtained, as I read the theory, from the careful scrutiny of actual or vital experience (Erlebniss) in a way in which its psychical occurrence is not concerned, and by which the connections and distinctions which its nature presents can be apprehended as essential characters *a priori* of that nature. I suppose (it is my own example) that harmonic relations between musical sounds are in this sense essential and *a priori*. It does not matter whether you hear them or imagine them or how you get at the contemplation of them. To the musically competent mind the relations are essential (as the formal æstheticians said) and cannot be otherwise while the complex is ideally the same. Such a region of *apriorism*, independent of psychological occurrence, but also unembarrassed by any affirmation of metaphysical reality or transcendence, is, as I understand, what Husserl calls Phenomenology.

The vehemence with which here, as we observed also in Cassirer, "metaphysical postulates"²⁵ or "philosophical

23. Husserl, *Jahrbuch*, i. 81.

24. "The physical thing." Exact physical determinations do not fall within experience proper. But the perceived thing itself is always and essentially the precise thing which the physicist determines. "Even the higher transcendence of the physical thing indicates no reaching out beyond the world which is for consciousness," *ib.*, 99-100. This contention is directed against "the realism which is so prevalent" (p. 97), "which takes the actually perceived as phenomenal of a wholly unknown reality." This would hardly apply in full, *e.g.* to Külpe's Realism. But it would apply to Vaihinger's Idealism, see above, p. 202, on the difficulty of discriminating these attitudes. Husserl's view indicates a desirable completeness of treatment.

25. *Ib.*, 106-7.

argument from above," are repudiated, is exceedingly remarkable to the student of the method. Necessity is ascribed to intuition, not in any mysterious sense, but simply as looking carefully at a complex, and "seeing" what it inevitably implies. And, as I gather, such an "intuition," however sound under its conditions, may have to be reconsidered or amended²⁶ through conflict with a no less sound intuition based on a different complex. One might almost suggest that we have here the principle that "the truth is the whole" applied to every relative totality, but so far only as that particular whole or complex will carry us. So understood, it would be a strikingly suggestive account of *apriorism*.

I said near the beginning of this lecture that to the unbiassed modern reader of Fichte and Hegel the difference of method between them and the modern leaders of German thought is not so great as might be supposed. And also I am compelled to think that the term "metaphysic," disparagingly employed by these distinguished moderns, is encumbered with a merely traditional reference to the metaphysic which Kant criticised in the special light in which he criticised it. Their usage does not seem to me to imply reluctance to deal with questions which are really metaphysical, or at least to prepare for dealing with them. When we speak of *a priori* truth, even of an ideal type, of the difference between ideal and real science, of a system of reality whether immanent or transcendent, it seems to me that we are beyond what in strict method should belong to epistemology (though some would say that if you leave to epistemology only what is its own, you leave it nothing at all), and we are already well in the realm of metaphysic. Nevertheless the critical attitude—the attitude of anticipatory theory—is persistent, so far as I can see, in the very best thought of the last fifteen years in Germany. It almost seems as if what we called

26. *Ib.*, 36-7, 43-4.

the first phase of the century's rhythm had left behind it a timidity—the burnt child dreads the fire—which is not in itself altogether logically justified.

There are further examples in support of such a suggestion. So eminent a biologist and logician as Driesch, intending, as I understand, to pave the way for a metaphysic, feels bound to start from a solipsistic position.²⁷ No less a thinker than Külpe, again, in promising an account of the scientific affirmation of reality, appears to advance the conception of an "inductive metaphysic."²⁸ And a question of principle might be raised, whether, if you start from solipsism or from induction (in any genuinely distinctive sense, such as verification of suggestions by sensuous experience) you can ever get to Metaphysic at all.

Even the latest utterance of the Marburg school,²⁹ which in plain words avows a certain affinity to Hegel in the total determination of all experience by thought as contrasted with the recognition of any given factor, such as sensation—even this declaration adheres tenaciously to the line of construction and progress *ad infinitum* which the school's mathematical preoccupation suggests. So that,

27. Driesch. *Ordnungslehre*, p. 4.

28. Külpe, *Realisirung*, 189 ff. This discussion of what is possible for metaphysic to-day is of extreme interest. It is very strongly marked by the sense of a total break with pre-Kantian ontology, which is characterised in such a phrase as "über alle Möglichkeit einer Erfahrung hinaus" in a way which I must confess impresses me as uncritical. Would it be maintained, e.g. that God is not experienced? But the central point is that the substantive nature of metaphysic is judiciously assigned, though the importance of the sciences for it is, as throughout our second and third phases, in my view exaggerated. The main conception, however, which we have suggested is sustained by all these latest developments, viz. that after a very complete reaction, surviving in the terror of ontology which still prevails, a new metaphysic is forming itself, which will in due time, probably without much explicit recognition, reconquer and incorporate with itself the valuable elements of the old.

29. Natorp, *op. cit.*

when we consider the open ideal as we might call it—the eternal unfulfilment—to which this view abandons the universe, we might doubt whether the school is not still too “critical” to possess a genuine metaphysic. And yet, as we saw in the case of Cassirer, it undoubtedly possesses in detail many points of view which have considerable metaphysical value.

It is therefore with a good deal of interest that one notes the revival by Nelson,³⁰ in a new sense, of the old contention that the theory of cognition, as an anticipatory enquiry into the possibility of knowledge, is impossible because self-contradictory. There might indeed be a doubt whether the “critical” doctrine offered as a substitute—the support of metaphysical judgments by appeal to an immediate non-intuitive cognition—is not itself a form of that search for a “pure experience” which appeared to us to belong to the epistemological attitude, if not, in this case, even to a position which is psychological. But in any case, the mere raising of the question is a strong instance of the rapprochement to Metaphysic which we hope and believe that we are right in ascribing to modern Germany.

We have now, I trust, seen something of the main rhythm and direction of German thought in the nineteenth century. It was no pleasure to me to neglect all the great men whom I mentioned at the beginning, and to abstain from noticing the *Æsthetic* of Lipps, the value-philosophy of Ehrenfels and Meinong, and the *Denkpsychologie* of Ach and Watt and Bühler. And I could well have spent a whole lecture or course of lectures on the significance of the materialists, or the peculiar influence of Nietzsche. But, to parody a sentence of Hegel, if we were to do anything, it was necessary to do something in particular. And the central battle, it seems to me, must always be decided on the logical and metaphysical field. Ethics and æsthetics, sociology and political science will “follow the

30. See *Acts of Bologna Congress*, i. 286, and p. 192 above.

flag "; will share the metaphysical orientation. And so I hope that we may have gained a definite impression, not wholly incorrect, of the pulse and tendency of the great intellectual organisation which we have been contemplating. And I shall venture to conclude by expressing, in old phrases of my Oxford teachers and of my own, my conviction that "a nation does not lose what thinkers like the great post-Kantians have taught it"; that sensationalism, materialism, and other "weak persuasions" matter much less in a country where so deep a philosophical culture is presupposed, than over here where they might be taken *au pied de la lettre*; and that it is true of the post-Kantian movement, as T. H. Green, the Oxford Idealist, is reported to have said, that "it must all be done over again," we may at least find everywhere to-day, in the wide and strong foundations which are being laid, a guide and support for our undying faith in a future metaphysic, which though not quite the metaphysic of the past, will be a metaphysic still.

VIII.—THE HISTORY OF MUSIC

BY

F. BONAVIA

THE HISTORY OF MUSIC

ANY account within the present limits of German music during the most eventful hundred years of its existence can necessarily be no more than an outline of its main course. It has therefore been considered preferable to leave untouched important sections, like chamber music and song, since they were fed by and dependent upon the two great streams of activity—symphony in the first half of the century, opera in the second. If Cornelius and Marschner are not mentioned it is not that they were considered unimportant but that they affected only slightly the main current. Even of Beethoven and Wagner—the two greatest figures of the century—only those aspects of their music are discussed which show most unambiguously the thought of the time and the progress towards a more comprehensive ideal.

Considerable as the reform of Gluck had been in the eighteenth century it yet left an opening for reactionary tendencies. Gluck was not unwilling to admit the claim of poetry in musical drama at the expense of music. Conventionality dictated the theme of the opera. Some fifty operas were composed in the eighteenth century alone on the subject of Ariadne and many more on Alexander. Moreover, Gluck had left untouched the all-important question of styles. After the death of John Sebastian Bach musicians began to forsake the old polyphony for a style which aimed at centering all interest on a single line-melody, to which all the rest was made subservient. For the sake of what they regarded as beauty of melody they came in time to sacrifice all force and proportion. Composition was gradually reduced to a search for the softest, easiest medium. Everything except melody could be expressed in terms of a stereotyped formula. Until Schumann and Mendelssohn discovered it anew the

magnificent polyphonic machinery of Bach lay forgotten and useless. His mournful presage, "Die alte Art der Musik will unsern Ohren nicht mehr klingen," was proving only too true. The baneful influence of Court patronage had permeated the whole body of music and sapped its natural vitality. Gluck had to devote years of his life to the production of vapid entertainments for the Viennese Court. Even the music of Mozart had no national significance. It was never in touch with the bulk of the people. It was the pastime of courtiers, and the courtiers of Vienna patronised with equal generosity the product of German, Italian and Slav. From the day when Haydn entered Vienna until Liszt produced "Lohengrin" in Weimar, the Austrian capital was the most important centre of music in Europe. But it was not a centre where national characteristics were cultivated. The poetry of the Italian Metastasio was applauded as well as the music of Haydn—a Slav—or of Beethoven, the first of the great German composers of the period. To give back to Germans their patrimony of folk-song, to revive the art of polyphony, to raise music from a delightful pastime to an art of national importance was the task of the nineteenth century.

To achieve this two things were essential. In the first place, it was necessary to sweep aside all that was formal and conventional in the texture of musical composition, to fashion a new instrument capable of expressing deeper emotions, of combining the majesty of Bach with the charm of Mozart. This was the mission of Beethoven. It was also necessary to assert once for all the right of the composer over the singer and free the way for musical drama which should not depend for its existence on the skill of the chief interpreters. The history of opera before the nineteenth century is based on the antagonism between singer and composer. The conflict between the polyphonic and the melodic style was certainly fostered by the preference of singers for melody which enabled them to

pose as the autocrats of the operatic stage. Since singers preferred Italian, Gluck and Mozart had to use Italian libretti. To restore to his place the composer, to find a juster proportion between music and drama was the task of Wagner. Beethoven and Wagner are the two greatest figures in the music of the nineteenth century, and the advance marked by the symphonies of Beethoven find a fitting parallel in the progress of Wagner's operas. The two movements combined represent the most important evolution music has ever known up to the present time.

At the close of the eighteenth century the most representative figures in music were Haydn and Mozart. Neither of them foreshadows in any way the sudden change to come. Of the two, Haydn is perhaps nearer to the ideals of the future since he instinctively felt the value of folksong. But Mozart, who has left a deeper mark in history, belongs wholly to the older order of things. His music represents the highest point reached by those who made fineness and delicacy their chief aim. Its simplicity and directness, its technical neatness, the perfection of its proportions, the symmetry of its design, its serenity—these were only made possible by the fact that it compendiated all the musical thought of Mozart's time. But it is not national. The best Italians come considerably closer to Mozart than other more typically German composers. A rich harmonic web, and the epic grandeur of opera which have ever characterised German music from Gluck to Strauss are not his, but the loveliness, the naïve charm, a certain scholastic clarity of counterpoint, qualities which the Italians held to be the end of all music. With Mozart the supremacy of the Austrian composer comes to an end. Schubert and Hugo Wolf, the greatest Austrian musicians of the nineteenth century, did not affect the course of music in the same degree as Beethoven or Wagner. Brahms and Beethoven, although they spent a considerable part of their life in Vienna, were neither of them Austrians.

One act, however, of Mozart's life is not without signifi-

cance for future history. When, after experiencing the brutality of his patron, Bishop Hieronymus, Mozart resigned his post in the prelate's household, he marked the end of the era of patronage in music no less definitely than Johnson's "civil" letter to Chesterfield made an end to patronage in English literature. In the nineteenth century the patronage of musicians still existed, but it was no longer the best means to success. The patron retained the privilege of subscribing for the publication of the composer's work, of applauding and flattering him, but he ceased to have an active influence. He could no longer demand work or supply the occasion for it. Beethoven wrote when he pleased and whatever he chose. The "*pièce d'occasion*" was a gracious act, not a duty. The narrow-minded patronage which bound musicians to the household of a prince was incompatible with the new movement towards independence of thought and action. It is true that in some cases it might have freed the recipient from the necessity of having to earn a precarious livelihood, but it was also bound to isolate him from the mass of the people. The great musicians of the nineteenth century drew their strength from the thought as well as from the songs of the masses. But the transition from the patronage of the nobles to that of the public at large was a period of severe trial, as the case of Schubert and of Mozart himself proves, and a reversion to the old conditions would not have been improbable if the first man to stand alone had not possessed moral qualities as well as musical genius of the highest order.

Beethoven was acquainted with both Haydn and Mozart. The latter knew him only slightly. Haydn, on the other hand, could number Beethoven amongst his pupils, and although the lessons do not appear to have been much to the taste of either pupil or master, it is not unlikely that they at least had the effect of inspiring Beethoven with a love for melody of the folk-song type and of drawing his attention to the possibilities of the variation-form. In every way the temper of the two was fundamentally different. Beethoven,

like Haydn, lived on good terms with the titled Mæcenas of Viennese society, but the great affliction which troubled him during the greater part of his existence developed a sensitiveness, a liking for solitude, a spiritual life which recalls the later years of another giant who had to bear the weight of misfortune, Milton. Beethoven was sincerely religious, but his was one of those natures which shrink from parading their profoundest convictions. Like most of his predecessors, he could only express himself in music. Weber, Schumann, Wagner, Berlioz, were, in varying degrees, experienced writers; but for Beethoven music was the only means of expression. We must look to his work and to the known facts of his life rather than to the few notes he left behind for an insight into his character. His articles of faith are the "canzone in modo lidico," the devotional mood which tempers the gaiety of the last sections of the ninth symphony and the "Missa Solemnis." Outwardly he was brusque in manner and intolerant of conventionalities and restrictions. Like General Von Bose, he did not hesitate to break rules when he found them an obstacle in his way. After a few tentative efforts before the closing of the eighteenth century he made directly for his goal and never paused until he had reached it. To Mozart's success the definition of "divine accident" applies with some fitness—not to Beethoven. Will-power and moral force are intrinsic qualities of the nine symphonies. Themes did not occur easily to Beethoven in their finished form. He had to cast them again and again before they acquired the required shape—an operation which sometimes taxed his uncommon strength to the utmost. Moreover, his favourite forms—the symphony and the quartet—are the most exacting of all musical schemes.*

* Gautier says : l'oeuvre sort plus belle

d'une forme au travail

Rebelle,

Vers, marbre, onyx, email.

Some of the earliest compositions of Beethoven contain plain hints that a change is about to take place. Sometimes it is a melodic phrase that is no longer gracious and tender but passionately insistent. Or it may be that the place usually assigned to the minuet in the symphony is given to a scherzo so odd and whimsical that it seems almost a witty caricature of the stately dance. The final change came in 1802 when Beethoven announced definitely his intention of setting out on a new path. The "Eroica," the immediate outcome of the resolve, is the first of the nine symphonies to throw light on the new tendencies. What are the chief characteristics of the Eroica, in what does it differ essentially from all the symphonies written before? In the first place, there is the extension of structure; then there is the substitution of the dramatic for a purely lyrical type of melody. The greatest structural change takes place in the quick middle movement which stands for the minuet of the older composers. The change in the character of the melody is evident mostly in the first and second sections. The scherzo retains the barest outline of the parent dance-form, the matter is altogether new, and implies a general refinement of technical means opening sources hitherto unknown. Rhythm is no longer a frame for the action but itself an agent. Dissonance is not simply a retarder of consonance but acquires a significance and a value of its own as a dramatic element. The change in the melody is slightly more complex. There is, most notable, a tendency to shorten its ordered measure, to compress it, to reduce it to the marrow; then, enlarged and developed by a manifold system of variations, to make it capable of expressing every shade of thought. The poise of the very first phrase with its suspended resolution arrests attention. Themes are no longer found in rigid groups of four or eight bars; they move freely, obeying a much subtler rhythmical instinct. The second subject in the first movement of the Eroica consists in its shortest form of

three bars with so touchingly human an appeal that it has the eloquence of a sudden gesture, a glance, rather than that which was then conceived to be peculiar to music. Such examples are plentiful in all the later Beethoven's scores. This reduction of melody to a pregnant symbol has proved the basis of all modern advance. It enhances the emotional value of the sentence which becomes more pointed, and it opens infinite possibilities of variation—the starting point of the Wagnerian leit motif. In the majesty of the funeral march there is perhaps less of technical novelty; the imaginative quality of its fugal section, in which the voices of the mourners seem to rise in supplication, is, however, a wonderful example of an old form galvanised into new life. The pitiful wail at the end, which, it is said, ran insistently in Moscheles' mind as he stood by the death-bed of Mendelssohn, is entirely of the new order.

The next landmark, the C Minor Symphony, carries still further the lesson of the Eroica, and stands out as the first musical composition to reflect the political events of its time. The intended dedication of the Eroica to Napoleon would have fitted this symphony far better. It was a time requiring bold and quick action. Boldness, determination and self-assertion are at the root of the C Minor Symphony. In oneness of aim, in its splendid unity it is without parallel. All the usual canons are set aside. Contrast is obtained by viewing the subject from another standpoint rather than by opposing themes of different character. Immediately after the appearance of the eight notes said to represent the second or subsidiary subject the design of the first theme is added to it by way of contrapuntal support, and this design, this symbol, is, in fact, present throughout the piece. Its short frame is contrived admirably for contrapuntal purposes. It is in place everywhere and always used with telling effect. It knits together the whole texture indissolubly. Even the other movements partake of the general character approach-

ing the central idea of the symphony from different points to end invariably in an assertion of power and determination. Every chord of the finale is an affirmation of indomitable will. The usual divisions into main and subsidiary subjects lose their importance here, since all the subjects express the same idea having the same æsthetic intention and value.

With the Pastoral Symphony Beethoven touches upon a very different aspect of the musical development of the century. The Eroica stands for the warlike moods aroused by the Napoleonic era. The Pastoral represents the new feeling for Nature still embryonic, but none the less perfectly genuine. Nature for him is a source of unceasing delight; he does not penetrate her subtler moods. He finds in nature the peace and solitude the town-dweller seeks vainly in his familiar haunts. Her sterner, awful aspects, like her mysticism, music did not penetrate until Wagner interpreted the symbol. Mendelssohn and Berlioz caught the hidden threat under the external loveliness. But even the company of peasants in the Pastoral Symphony, rejoicing in the return of the sunshine, are a considerable advance on the Thirsis and Chloe affectations of the previous era. And although Beethoven failed to carry these ideas to their logical conclusion, he was perfectly aware how nature ought to be approached. "*Mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung als Malerei*," is the definition he gives of the symphony. Yet, curiously enough, he descends to a mere imitation as close as possible of the song of the nightingale, the twitter of the quail, and the call of the cuckoo. In spite of the many happy strokes of a technical kind the "Pastoral" is still bound by a conventional conception. It is, in fact, little more than a catalogue of Nature's habitual effects.

These are the symphonies which stand out conspicuously in the historic advance. The ninth symphony, the greatest of them all, is, apart from the introduction of the chorus, an enlargement of previous themes rather than a new

departure. It sums up all previous achievements; its melody is even more pregnant than before, its dramatic appeal more searching. But the means by which the result is attained are essentially the same.

The immediate result of the nine symphonies of Beethoven was to place Germany highest amongst all the musical nations—a position she has maintained ever since. They fixed for all time the importance of the symphony and opened the way for future progress not only in the classical but in musical drama. How much Wagner owes to Beethoven no one has yet attempted to compute, but it is generally acknowledged that the debt is great. The symphony is a form peculiarly suited to the German temperament as it demands besides inventive genius and imagination a sense of order and power of organisation,—qualities in which Germans have ever excelled. But even in those countries where the symphony has never taken firm root the example of Beethoven put heart into reformers and stimulated progress. Beethoven was the battle-cry of Berlioz and Boito when they sought to free the music of France and Italy from the deadly grip of conventional routine.

Beethoven had no immediate successor; Wagner is the only nineteenth century musician whose reforms can be compared with his. Less of a heroic temper than these Schubert might have emulated Mozart in naïve simplicity if Beethoven had not been. The effect of the combined influence of Mozart and Beethoven was to make of Schubert the most romantic of the symphonic writers. A Southerner, he betrays his origin by his reliance upon melody, by the want of intensity in his style which is lucid rather than robust. The design, sometimes too vast for the matter which rests upon it, is, however, the chief failing of Schubert. Unrecognised during his lifetime, he is now held to stand considerably nearer to Beethoven than the accomplished, facile, admired Mendelssohn. To Mendelssohn indeed posterity has

assigned a much lower position than his contemporaries would have thought possible. Though a native like Brahms of Hamburg, he has none of the characteristics of the Northern men. Of his considerable output only those works have survived which show to best advantage his gift for colour. The rest is as forgotten as Lord Lytton's novels in spite of the unquestionable fluency of his melody and the impeccable shape of his phrases. Extremely sensitive to outside influence, he fell under the sway of romanticism. "The Midsummer Night's Dream" music, the Hebrides overture are fine examples of the stimulating effect of poetry upon music. These are in truth symphonic poems which admit of the usual divisions of the classical plan, although critics who admire Mendelssohn not wisely may hesitate to admit it. A citizen of the world Mendelssohn could not well represent national tendencies. But wherever he went, he carried with him the passionate desire for fantastic beauty and scenery. At the Hebrides he saw

. . . . the foam
of perilous seas

and he searched South and North Italy and Scotland for the "faery lands forlorn."

But neither Mendelssohn nor Schubert could assimilate one feeling of romanticism. The worship of heroism which sent Byron to fight for Greece and produced Werther in Germany, Jacopo Hortis in Italy, which stirred so deeply Berlioz in France, has no parallel in German music until we come to Schumann, the last and the most important of the romantics of the century. Beethoven was of the people; Schubert, like Mendelssohn, stands for the new interest in extravagant and fantastic beauty; Schumann for the individual consciousness aroused by the worship of heroism. It is the business of the exponent of heroism to focus attention on the individual and to excite emulation which must needs take

the form of a noble egotism. In Schumann we find for the first time the striving after personality. "Mensch und musiker suchten sich immer gleichzeitig bei mir auszusprechen," he said. In many ways he forms the most striking contrast to Mendelssohn. One was all for colour, brightness, smooth curves, using material which, ready at hand, could be made to appear new after polishing and re-fashioning. Schumann's qualities are intimacy, loftiness of ideas, personality and a disregard for common effects which falls not far short of contempt. He was not endowed with a capacity for writing fluent melodies like Mozart, and he had too critical a mind to dare with the boldness of Beethoven, yet he is the most important link in the chain connecting the music of the nineteenth century to the music of our own day. He saw the value of closer unity and sought to achieve it by the use of a "motto" which was to connect all the threads of the symphony. He used the variation-form with the mastery of Beethoven; his themes are, like those of Beethoven, fraught with significance and possibilities. Without Mendelssohn the music of the nineteenth century would have lost much, though its course would not have been different. But Schumann was needed to clinch the truth proclaimed by Beethoven that plastic beauty is not the only important element of music; that in song a close connection between words and music is essential; finally, that thought is of greater value than a naturally facile temperament. Schumann was the first to hail the advent of Brahms and to discover the importance of Bach in German music to whom, he said, music owes as great a debt as religion to its founder. He was, moreover, the first and the soundest of critics. During the years in which he owned and edited the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* (1834—1853) he laid the foundation of all modern criticism. The practical knowledge he possessed of the subject and his keenly critical mind may have affected his composition, to some extent, in a not auspicious manner since those whose

place is in the van must sometimes rely on instinct rather than knowledge. But knowledge is the first qualification for criticism, and some of his writings are as permanent as his symphonies. Of catholic taste, he spoke with equal authority on such varied composers as Berlioz and Chopin. To his contemporaries his judgment of Meyerbeer may have appeared severe; posterity, however, has come to see the justice of his strictures.

During the first half of the century the symphony was the most important musical product of Germany.* In the second half the operas of Wagner began to loom on the horizon, but before the claims of opera gained general recognition the symphony found one more exponent around whom the upholders of classicism or "pure music" rallied to maintain its superiority against all other forms. Schumann used a happy phrase when, in a memorable article in the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*, entitled "Neue Bahnen," he describes Johannes Brahms as "armed at all points." He appears, in fact, invulnerable. No matter from what standpoint he is considered he is found true and irreproachable. Although temperamentally he differs considerably from Beethoven he carried to their logical conclusion Beethoven's innovations, and in many ways his work is the complement of Beethoven's. When Wagner was opposed to Brahms and opera to symphony his right to be regarded as Beethoven's successor was denied. But it is difficult to see on what grounds the denial could be based. The affinity between the last of Beethoven's and the first of Brahms' sonatas for piano and violin is greater than that of any other two compositions by men of strong individual character. Perhaps we are ourselves too near to Brahms to express anything like a final judgment. The very flawlessness of his armour makes one fear that the future will discover the weakness which is hidden from us. But if dignity of conception and loftiness of ideas are the test of classicism, surely Brahms

* The first performance of *Lohengrin* took place in 1850 at Weimar.

is the most classical of them all. For all his aristocratic taste he was not incapable of being swayed by the feelings which appeal to the majority. On the contrary, no one has utilised folk-song to better purpose, and the charm of some of his songs as of his arrangements of Hungarian dance-tunes is as clear to the cultivated as to the unlearned. But even in the presence of death he maintains a dignity which gives to the "Ernste Gesänge" the tone of a weighty prophecy. The modern symphony recognises Beethoven as its founder. It found in Schubert its most melodious voice. It became with Schumann the medium of most intimate thought; Brahms gave it its loftiest, most serene expression.

In the symphony the Germans had practically the field to themselves. In opera, however, the rivalry of the Italians could not well be ignored. The antagonism was based quite as much on style as on the actual technique of the music. Germany had shown a distinct bias for polyphony while the Italians favoured the melodic type. The antagonism, although in a less acute form, exists to this day. In the early nineteenth century and even later, Italians denied practically all virtue to polyphonic music; the worship of melody was carried by them to such an extent that the elementary rules of all drama were sacrificed for the sake of conventional divisions which gave singers the opportunity of excelling, first in the treatment of broad melody then in the execution of technical feats.* Music had no part in the unfolding of the story and was confined to a number of melodious pieces which commented

* The Italian opera of the eighteenth century depended on singers as much as the *Commedia dell'Arte* depended on actors. The only difference was that in a musical entertainment pre-arrangement cannot be altogether dispensed with. Virtuosi had, however, a full opportunity for improvisation in the "cadenza." In any case even serious artists did not scruple to ignore the composer's intentions to suit their tastes. It is highly probable that one passage in the modern editions of Beethoven's violin concerto is an interpolation of a not too scrupulous editor.

lyrically upon the dramatic situation. The actual business of the drama was carried on mostly by the *Recitativo*, a hybrid between song and speech, which seldom had any musical interest whatever. The most varied situations could be accompanied by a sequence of harmonies corresponding to a formula in which invention had no part. The actual number of melodies—arias and cabaletta—was dependent not upon the fitness of certain situations for lyrical expression, but on the number of singers needed for the action. No singer of reputation cared to take part in an opera which did not give him a full opportunity of displaying his individual peculiarities. So great was the tyranny of the vocalist that in time “arias” came to be written expressly for this or that singer, and the music had to be arranged so as to bring out the qualities of the individual performer. Pergolesi’s “*La Serva Padrona*,” probably the best Italian example of the opera in which *Recitativo* alternating with the *Aria*, obeys the most conventional plan ever imposed on an artistic form. Mozart himself only altered the pattern in so much that the *Recitativo* is often no mere stereotyped formula but has sincerity and interest of its own. The difficulties which stood in the way of reform were many; chief amongst them the fact that singers were naturally loath to abandon their position as arbiters of the opera. The public besides had come to look upon the opera as a collection of musical pieces for which the action furnished the occasion.

In 1821 Spontini had just won a considerable success with “*Olympie*” in Berlin, when Weber, then known only as the composer of patriotic folk-songs, produced “*Der Freischütz*” at another theatre. The impression it made was such that “*Olympie*” and its composer were immediately forgotten, and in a short time all Germany proclaimed Weber a national champion. And in many ways Weber represented the spirit of his nation and of his time. Apart from the patriotism which sent him to Körner for the words of his songs, his music is imbued

with the romanticism which later led Wagner to "Die Meistersinger," as well as to the "Niebelungen Ring." To Weber belongs the honour of having first understood the full potentiality of a modern orchestra, its fitness to suggest by means of music what till then had been reserved for poetry. Just as Schumann later found the perfect ratio between words and notes in song, Weber discovered the just proportion between the singer and the orchestra. The feeling for nature which found expression in Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony becomes in Weber a still deeper appreciation of the infinitely varied aspects Nature can present. Not the beauty of lake and woodland alone appeal to him, but also her mystery and terror. He made even one attempt in "Euryanthe" to abolish the old Recitativo and to mould words and music into one great scene or act; but "Euryanthe," for different reasons, did not succeed, and it was reserved for Wagner to bring German opera to its most perfect form. "Fidelio," magnificent as it is musically, did not affect the actual form of opera. Weber's one failing was the choice of texts unsuitable for dramatic representation. "Oberon," like "Euryanthe," is built on a text which could not possibly interest a critical audience.*

Much in the way in which Beethoven welded the symphony into an almost new form capable of expressing what had been thought before to be beyond music, Wagner evolved from the conventional opera of his predecessor a type which has ever since been accepted as the best possible combination of dramatic action and music. His reform in regard to the drama is as radical as the advance in technique. The most glaring faults of the old system which wedded music to words of a diametrically opposite character in order to show the skill of the singer in melody

* More judgment in this respect was shown by Heinrich Marschner, Weber's assistant at the Dresden Opera House, who, although considerably influenced by his colleague, yet shares with him the distinction of having influenced in some degree Richard Wagner.

and "bravura," the utter absurdity of a conception which subordinated the needs of the drama to the insatiable ambition of singers—had been modified to some extent by Weber. But Wagner was the first to distinguish between dramatic subjects those to which music could best be applied. He chose invariably a broad subject and situations which gave music every opportunity for expansion and comment. The first act of the "*Valküre*," for instance, one of the longest single acts in existence, consists of three scenes almost devoid of the incidents by which the dramatic author usually interests his audience. Yet it is so perfect a thing of its kind that the dramatic interest never flags for a moment. Milton and sometimes Shakespere show equal disregard for the pressing of incident upon incident which is often miscalled "dramatic business"; they trust solely to the power of the word as Wagner trusts solely to the power of music. Even the earlier operas—"Tannhäuser," "*Lohengrin*"—show a considerable reduction of dramatic apparatus compared with other operas of the time.

The symphonic recitative is the most important Wagnerian contribution to the technique of opera, for it enables the composer to give musical interest to those parts of the action which in the old days would have been accompanied by a few threadbare harmonies. By the use of the "*leit-motif*" the orchestra can assume the function of the Greek chorus, commenting upon the action, or anticipating it, or again describing and hinting at the events which led up to the situation of the moment. It matters little whether Wagner was the actual discoverer of the *leit-motif*, he was certainly the first to use it to such excellent purpose. But the *leit-motif* is not without its weak point. Practically in the whole of "*Meistersinger*" it is used with a skill and tact beyond praise, but in the "*Ring*" it leads Wagner to indulge in repetitions he would probably have avoided if he had not felt anxious to persuade himself and his listeners of the absolute soundness of the

theory. The same story is told over and over again, and every time it reappears the dramatic interest gives way to the purely musical. The story of the stolen gold is told again at considerable length in all the subsequent dramas, and narrative is fundamentally opposed to drama. What has been acted before our eyes will lose interest the oftener we hear it told.

No doubt Wagner would hold by the argument he applied to the words of his libretti. The words, he maintained, are only a peg on which to hang music.* But if words are used at all they cannot be disregarded. They must be measured by the standard usually applied to words. Good poetry must conform to the generally accepted definition by which it is distinguished from bad and indifferent poetry. The fact seems to be that Wagner could conceive a drama with all the imaginative force of the poet, although he lacked the technical facility to express his conception effectively by means of words alone. Tested by poetic standards these operas must be found wanting.

From "Tannhäuser" to "Parsifal" the Wagnerian plan is the same, even if the execution follows different lines. "Tannhäuser," "Lohengrin," "Tristan," the three plays forming "The Ring of Niebelung," "Parsifal," are all in three acts. Every act exhibits either the preparation, the development or the denouement of the central idea. The motive power is, with the exception of "The Ring" and, of course, of the great comic opera "Meister-singer," common to all his plays. The great Christian virtue of self-denial is the soul of "Tannhäuser" as of "Parsifal." Through sacrifice, through willing renunciation alone can one attain salvation. Incontinence and greed must end in disaster. The second part of "The Ring"

* In this respect Wagner is opposed to Gluck. Gluck held that music should be second to poetry, while Wagner maintained that the composer reaching to the thought underlying the word is perfectly justified in carrying his musical ideas beyond the limits warranted by the text.

seems to imply a different conclusion. The glorification of Siegfried—the Uebermensch, the impulse of life—overthrows every obstacle heedless of consequences, has been taken as typical of Wagner's philosophy of life. But Siegfried, like Tristran, like Amfortas, ends only in death and punishment. Probably it did represent at the time Wagner's ideal hero. No man can know the full worth of an idea of a system unless he tested and in the end found fallacious the opposite ideas and systems. The greatest saints have had to withstand the greatest temptations. But Parsifal as a typical Wagnerian hero is much more in accordance with precedents. Senta, Elisabeth, pure like Parsifal, are the means of remitting punishment and of salvation. Brunhilde and Elsa who break their allegiance, Siegfried, Tristan, Tannhäuser, Amfortas, because incontinent, must suffer and be the cause of suffering. The theme of Tannhäuser" is also the theme of "Parsifal," though the treatment is essentially different. There is in "Parsifal" a mellowing of tones, a new sympathy with suffering, a feeling of pity which has no parallel in the previous dramas and with it a less sure handling of the story. By far the greater part of its first act is given up to the narration and later actual representation of the punishment meted out to those who give way to temptation. There is here no Tannhäuser to stand up boldly and answer argument with argument proclaiming that the denial of the senses means the death of the world. But there is also no Siegfried to trample others underfoot that he may reach his end the sooner. The life of every breathing thing is sacred in the domains of the Grail.

In his choice of themes Wagner was thoroughly of his time. Religion is the first of the "higher things" for Novalis. Overbeck headed a school of painting which drew inspiration from religion. Fr. Schlegel attributed all artistic weakness to the want of sound mythological foundation. Self-restriction was for Goethe implied in

self-development. The interest in national ideas with the concomitant interest in history was one of the most important features of the quickening of imagination in the new sensibility known as romanticism. After religion the "higher things" for Novalis are love and politics. From these motives are derived "Tristan," a masterpiece of unity and directness, and "The Ring of the Niebelung," the most representative work of German romanticism impregnated with all its speculative elements—philosophy, love, religion, politics.

With tools refined and made perfect Wagner could express an appreciation of Nature which far surpasses that of all other composers with the possible exception of Debussy. The realism of Richard Strauss approaches Nature in the manner of the Pastoral with greater daring and also less sympathy. Dvorák's "In Der Natur" is more an ode in her praise than a representation of Nature. Mendelssohn and Berlioz were drawn towards her by strange rather than subtle aspects. In Wagner alone we meet a feeling of awe, of mysticism, an insistence on the relation between the moods of Nature and the moods of man. As a dramatic effect the sudden opening of the door, the flood of moonlight which surprises the lovers in Hunding's hut has no parallel in opera. Siegfried, Nature's child, understands the language of birds and waters. Parsifal bemoans the insensibility of nature to the sorrows of men. It is never a question of simply portraying Nature in music. It is always Nature in regard to men—the consummation of the idea implied in the "Mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung Als Malerei" of Beethoven's Pastoral.

As a critical writer Wagner commands attention no less than as a musician, not because of unimpeachable logic but because of the vastness of the argument and of the weighty questions raised. He was too much of a pioneer to rely purely on reason. He trusted to instinct first, then he attempted to justify instinct by reasoning. How often

his instinct was right is shown by the enormous advance he brought about in the technique of composition as in the form and purpose of musical drama. He broke down the conventionalities of the previous age. He substituted for the old recitativo a device of the utmost dramatic value. He fixed by his example certain rules in regard to the relation of music to words and the construction of musical drama. He raised the orchestra to equal rank with the singer. He is the originator of the modern art of conducting. Yet his writings are not always convincing. When he pleads forcibly for the union of music and poetry he starts on the initial fallacy that both arts have now reached the utmost limit of their development. He denies that Jews have a faculty of original invention. His "Wälschen Dunst und Wälschen Tand" has not yet been forgiven him by the most brilliant French critic of to-day. Wagner himself reversed the order in which music and poetry stood in the preceding century. In Gluck's time music was considered the handmaiden of poetry, Wagner made poetry the handmaiden of music. His one essay in philosophy fails to be convincing since it is open to doubt whether such a philosophy of music can be said to exist at all. But when he is deeply moved, as Nietzsche said, "pages escape him which are amongst the most beautiful that German prose possesses." Whatever he tells us—be the subject Beethoven or the art of conducting—has a note of unmistakable authority in spite of the controversial tone which probably accounts for the bitter polemics which once raged between his upholders and his opponents. At one time he was probably the most abused man in Europe, yet before the turn of the century he was acknowledged by every civilised community as the most important figure in the music of the nineteenth century. His innovations carried still another step further the reforms of Gluck. Technically they were not more—if not less important—than those of Beethoven, but Beethoven did not possess the literary ability and the

deep-rooted passion of Wagner for knowledge as well as for beauty in every form.

Of the small band which from the very outset understood and upheld the genius of Wagner no one has a better right to be remembered than Franz Liszt. If Wagner had the genius for devising and creating, Liszt had the genius for penetrating the new ideas. Affable, extremely popular with all grades of society, Liszt offered a striking contrast to the unknown Wagner of the early days, yet in Weimar, once the home of Goethe, Schiller and Herder, Liszt laid the foundation of Wagner's fame. The bond between them was the keen interest both felt in the future development of musical art. In spite of Wagner's belief that music had reached its utmost possible development the future loomed very large in the eye of the Weimar group. After the memorable first performance of "Lohengrin" at Weimar Wagner was urged by Liszt to "create a new work that we may go still further." Thus, founded on the common passionate longing for the new, sprang up a friendship in which Wagner was the leading spirit. Liszt, however, did not stay his desire for novelty as Wagner did by bringing music in contact with the thought of his time. Equally sensitive to the possibilities of the opera and of the symphony, he imagined a third form which partakes of the nature of both. Like the symphony, it requires no actor or stage; like the opera, it is founded on a poetic basis. Wagner held that words were not the first consideration in musical drama. Liszt suppressed words altogether and gave us the symphonic poem.* Bitterly resented, even in our own day, the new form has yet found considerable favour. The rules of the symphonic scheme are purely arbitrary and aim at securing efficient contrast. If the same end can be obtained by any other means, it becomes a work of supererogation to insist upon their universal

*Schumann's "Declamation," with pianoforte accompaniment, was an attempt in the opposite direction. It left words altogether free, and added music purely as a corollary.

application. The limitations of Liszt are of a very different order. It is not the supposed lack of symmetry that stands in the way of greatness, but rather the singular cosmopolitan character of Liszt's most ambitious work, the lack of marked individual features, the very catholicity of the composer's music, the fatal ease of some themes which are sometimes more like a brilliant improvisation than actual composition. Together with earnest striving towards high ideals—the subjects of his symphonic poems are derived from unimpeachable sources—there went a curious indulgence for what is obviously theatrical and undistinguished. Auber, Meyerbeer, Gounod, Verdi, were all considered worthy of supplying the background for brilliant pianoforte pieces. And most of his compositions bear evidence of this want of discrimination. When the subject is unambitious as in the Hungarian Rhapsodies he is most brilliantly successful. When he attempts a musical representation of the Divine Comedy one misses the directness, the authority of the great individual utterance. That he was a great performer we have on Wagner's authority. And he was much more than a great pianist. But he was a little less than a great composer.

From Liszt it is but a step to the other great German performers of the nineteenth century who alone made the new music possible.

It is one of the most striking features of the wonderful renaissance of German music that not one of its elements failed at the time when it was needed. As the centre of gravity was shifted from the singer to the instrumentalist Germans came immediately to the fore as performers. Beethoven and Wagner gave new life to the symphony and the opera. Spohr, Ernst, Joachim, trained the violinists who were to play them. At the same time Schumann, E. A. T. Hoffman, explained and popularised the claims of music. Historical writers like Pohl, Ambros and Jahn awakened interest in the past. Bülow and Richter developed the art of the conductor on the lines

laid down by Wagner. There is not one branch of music in which the Germans did not assume the lead to retain to the present day. And the importance of the school cannot easily be overrated. The success of the Italians before Gluck was due in part to the fact that they possessed far better schools than any other nation. Turin had Giambattista Somis, Corelli taught in Rome, Vivaldi in Venice, Tartini in Padua. To Italy once went the young German musicians who on their return founded the schools in which a Hellmesberger, a Sarasate, a Joachim were taught. At the present time the position is reversed, and the sometime students of Berlin and Leipzig are to be met with in Italy as well as in England and France. The influence of Germany is paramount in every branch of music. Grieg, who first showed us the charm of the Norwegian folk-song, Rubinstein, Siloti, owe an equal debt to German teaching.

Besides eminent composers and talented teachers, Germany possesses an admirable system of organisation on which sooner or later all other countries must model their institutions. The concert society in Germany need not be a flourishing commercial concern; the opera house need not pay a handsome dividend to its directors. Music is not expected to differ from painting in this respect. The Government, which pays for the upkeep of museums and picture galleries, endows with substantial sums the opera house, which thus offers to the best students of the Conservatorium an adequate return for their years of training. From Spohr to Joachim, from Thalberg to Bülow Germany never lacked in the nineteenth century teachers as authoritative as they were inspiring. But to the commonsense of the people is due the rapid realisation that no art can prosper which has scanty and uncertain opportunity of employment. Controlled by a responsible Government, freed from the anxiety of financial undertakings, the opera house can foster the love of good music and help to bring to light the latent musical qualities of

the nation. Where order and organisation are unknown much most valuable material must be lost. With subsidised theatres, well equipped schools, generously supported concert societies Germany holds to-day the position of leader and arbiter in the musical world, and since the world has acknowledged her just claims there has been no further question of "Wälschen Dunst und Wälschen Tand." Verdi found admirers in Brahms and Weingartner. Sgambati, Saint-Saens, Elgar, Delius, found appreciation in Germany sooner than amongst their own countrymen.

The history of the musical development of the nineteenth century is in the main the history of German music. When a similar movement towards freedom and a new order began in France, in Italy and later in England, the impulse came from Germany. The stimulus of Liszt and Wagner called into being the Russian School. In its completeness, in its unparalleled advance on any previous movement, in the rapidity and thoroughness with which it assailed and swept aside the ideals of the preceding century this period of musical history bears comparison with the most brilliant periods of painting or literature. It might indeed be called the golden century of German music were it not that sure signs are at hand to prove that its glory has not grown dim with the closing of the hundred years. Richard Strauss, Mahler, Reger, Humperdinck began their work before the turn of the century, giving music yet greater power and a richer complexity. But they belong essentially to the opening years of the following century. A historical survey of their work can hardly be attempted as yet, in the first place because in some cases it has not yet reached completion, and moreover the bewildering rapidity with which these men move implies constant readjustment of the critical apparatus. Individuality and technical progress are essential to-day to success in musical composition. It is hence natural that appreciation, critical or historical, should oscillate longer to-day than in the past.

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Britain's Case Against Germany

An Examination of the Historical Background
of the German Action in 1914

BY

RAMSAY MUIR,

Professor of Modern History in the University of Manchester

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EXTRACT FROM AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Despite the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of aloofness and impartiality during a great war, I have honestly tried in this little book to see the facts plainly, and never to tamper with them. My main purpose is to show that the great issue for which we are now fighting is no new thing, and has not emerged suddenly out of diplomatic difficulties in the Balkans. It is the result of a poison which has been working in the European system for more than two centuries, and the chief source of that poison is Prussia. Accordingly, I have tried to show (1) that the action of Germany in 1914 is due to a theory of international

politics which has taken possession of the minds of the German people since the middle of the nineteenth century; (2) that this theory is the outcome of the traditional policy of the Prussian state during the last two hundred and fifty years; (3) that it had to fight against a far nobler and more inspiring ideal, the ideal of the Germany of Goethe, of Stein and of Dahlmann, and only the dazzling success of the Prussian policy as pursued by Bismarck made possible its victory; (4) that the German Empire of to-day is so organised as to ensure the dominion of the Prussian military monarchy and of Prussian ideas and methods over the rest of Germany; and (5) that the policy of this Empire during the last quarter of a century has been the natural sequel of earlier Prussian action, and has found its inevitable culmination in the monstrous war of 1914.

But over against the Prussianised German State, with its poisonous belief in brute force, I have tried to show that there has been growing up in the rest of the civilised world a far nobler and saner view of the way in which international relations should be conducted. This view, increasing steadily in strength, has expressed itself in the development of the Concert of Europe, in the establishment of treaties for the protection of small states, in the growth of international arbitration, and in the whole remarkable movement which culminated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Germany has been throughout the most determined opponent of this whole movement; Britain has been throughout its strongest and most strenuous supporter.

In the British Empire, indeed, and in all that it increasingly stands for, we may reasonably claim to see the absolute antithesis of the German ideal: in its belief in self-government, in freedom, in variety the antithesis of the German belief in military monarchy, rigid discipline and uniformity; in its belief in peace the antithesis of the German praise of war; in its belief that Freedom and Justice are the supreme ends and justification of the state the antithesis of the German doctrine of Power. Perhaps this sharp conflict of ideals may provide part of the explanation for the extraordinary hatred which Germans express for everything British.

It is not for Power that we are fighting; it is not even for national existence, though that would be imperilled by a German victory. It is a conflict of national ideals, a struggle for all the deepest and highest things for which the best Englishmen have laboured in the past: for freedom, for the rights of small nationalities, for international honour, for the possibility of peaceful and friendly relationships between equal and mutually respecting states.

